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The Ethics of Corporate Lobbying 
Abstract 
 
This research sought to defend the proposition that not only do corporations have a moral right to 
lobby, corporations also have a moral duty to influence public policy through lobbying. The research 
has considered the ethics of corporate lobbying within the context of the extent literature in 
Business Ethics and from a South African perspective. An argument for corporate moral personhood 
has been advanced as the basis for a corporation’s moral right to lobby. The rights and duties of 
corporations as citizens have also been considered, and a case has been made for a normative 
theory of corporations as political actors with an associated moral obligation to seek to influence 
public policy to promote public interests. A set of ethical principles to guide responsible lobbying has 
been articulated as a morally justified basis for restricting a corporation’s moral right to lobby which 
arises from its status as a type of moral person to ensure that the power of corporations is 
harnessed in service of society.  
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Public trust in business has been undermined by repeated scandals, frauds, egregious 
mismanagement, and unlawful conduct. Recent examples include the collapse of Enron and Lehman 
Brothers, the interest-rate fixing scandal at Barclays, the Volkswagen emissions-rigging fraud, and in 
South Africa, collusion amongst food companies to fix the price of bread and between construction 
companies in their bids to build 2010 World Cup stadia, and the 2014 collapse of African Bank in part 
due to risky lending practices. These incidents, and others, have placed the ethics of business in the 
spotlight unlike ever before. 
 
Business has a pervasive influence: the conduct of corporations affects billions of people every day. 
This research report examines one type of corporate conduct that is widely-regarded as especially 
pernicious and unethical: corporate lobbying to influence public policy and regulation. In this 
research I’ll be investigating the ethics of corporate lobbying and answering the question as to 
whether a corporation has a moral duty to influence public policy. In addition to this, the importance 
of the research question will be considered.  
 
Lobbying is a set of activities undertaken with the aim of changing public policy and legislation. 
There does not appear to be a consensus in the literature as to whether corporate lobbying is a 
morally legitimate activity or not. The purpose of this research undertaking is to attempt to answer 
the following research question: Do corporations have a moral right and duty to influence public 
policy through lobbying? In seeking an answer to this question the following sub questions will also 
be considered: 
a) Can corporations be regarded as moral persons capable of moral agency? 
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b) Are attempts by business to influence public policy morally suspicious and illegitimate? Why, or 
why not? 
c) What justifies the moral right and duty of business to influence public policy? 
d) What moral principles should guide lobbying by business? 
This examination will be done in the context of the extant literature on ethics and lobbying, in 
particular and business ethics, in general. It will include consideration of the issue from a South 
African perspective, and identify issues of relevance for emerging and new democracies. 
 
Importance of the Research Question 
The ethical conduct of businesses, and the role of businesses in society, is the subject of 
considerable attention by many different actors in society: politicians; special interest groups; 
academics; and the business community itself. A related question concerns what the appropriate 
role of business in political processes, particularly policy-making. Public policy plays an increasingly 
significant role in the market, in addressing market failures, and introducing new legal requirements 
for firms in line with evolving moral norms about the ethical role of businesses (Néron, 2010: 344). 
Firms are “taking an increasingly active and visible role in public policy development and practice” 
and policy and regulation is increasingly aimed at “shaping more responsible markets … lobbying is 
hugely influential in this space” (AccountAbility, 2005: 11). Regulation is a very strong shaper of 
corporate conduct, and as Néron (2010: 344) notes: this implies that a primary focus of business 
ethics should be a determination of the appropriate political role of the corporation.  
 
It is perhaps therefore surprising that “the business and corporate social responsibility literature 
contains little discussion of the ethics of business efforts to influence public policy decisions” 
(Weber, 1997: 73). Néron (2010: 344) asserts that “normative theories of corporate rights, 
obligations … have failed to take seriously … that ‘the most critical dimension of corporate 
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responsibility may well be a company’s impact on public policy’.” In this light, Alzola (2013: 391) 
claims there is “an urgent need for the study of the ethics of engaging in corporate political activity.”  
 
Much of the academic work on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has also tended to neglect 
lobbying and political activities of corporations (Bauer, 2014: 64, and Scherer, Palazzo and Matten, 
2014: 148) despite the moral questions raised about the real and potential contradictions between a 
corporation’s CSR activities and its lobbying activities. Much of the theoretical analysis of corporate 
political activity and lobbying has ignored the ethical implications of such activities (Dahan, Hadani, 
and Schuler, 2013: 367), despite persistent public concern about the moral legitimacy of this sort of 
corporate conduct. The literature that does exist on this subject is predominantly concerned with 
the actions of corporations in the US (and to a lesser extent other Western countries). There is very 
little discussion of the topic in the context of new and emerging democracies, such as South Africa, 
where different political systems and moral norms may apply (South Africa, for example, is 
characterized by a strong commitment to social dialogue in policy-making). Examination of the ethics 
and morality of lobbying is equally important in these contexts. The Mail & Guardian has opined 
(November 28 to December 4, 2014: 30): “Democracy’s next challenge: … a debate on ethical 
lobbying is more urgent than we imagined … How do we ensure that there is honest lobbying and 
that public debate is not corrupted by corporate interests?”  
 
The need to examine the ethics of lobbying and how to prevent the hijacking of public debate and 
policy making by corporate interests is particularly important in young democracies like South Africa. 
And so too is the need to properly set the perimeter for what is fair, honest, just, and moral lobbying 
and to demarcate this from what is unfair, dishonest, unjust, and immoral lobbying. 
 
Thesis Statement 
The following thesis statement will be defended in answer to the research question above: 
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“Not only is business lobbying morally permissible, it is a moral duty of business to lobby to influence 
public policy”. The claims for the arguments that will be presented for the thesis are summarized as 
follows: 
a) A corporation is a type of moral person with similar moral rights and duties as natural persons. 
b) A corporation has a moral right to engage in activities that influence public policy. 
c) This right does not erode the principle of political equality and justice. 
d) A corporation has a moral duty to influence public policy in the interests of its shareholders and 
stakeholders, and in its role as corporate citizen in a pluralist, democratic system. 
e) A corporation has a moral duty to influence public policy through responsible lobbying practices. 
  
There are two legs to my argument for the above thesis and these will proceed along the following 
lines: 
 
1. Corporations are moral persons, which enjoy moral rights and responsibilities that are 
similar in nature, although not always identical to, those accorded to natural persons. These 
include the right to freedom of speech, and the right of political participation. As such, a 
case will be made that corporations have a moral right to lobby to influence public policy. 
 
2. The duties of corporations include corporate citizenship and responsible participation in 
public policy processes. This leg of the argument looks to the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa and the proposition that it serves as a normative framework that rests, in part, 
on a social contract between moral entities, and on recognition that stakeholders should not 
be treated as mere means to an end. This particular South African version of the social 
contract provides a normative basis for stakeholder theory and corporate citizenship, and is 
also evident in other South African legislation such as the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council Act, 1994. A case will be presented that corporations have a moral duty 
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to participate in the policy and legislative process as morally responsible corporate citizens, 
and this duty is heightened for businesses which are operating in countries with similar 
constitutions to those of South Africa, as well as countries with a similar tradition of social 
dialogue and social partnership. 
 
These two sub-arguments seek to provide a moral justification for corporate lobbying that will be 
founded on an exploration of the concept of corporate citizenship, and a normative theory of the 
firm as a political actor. In this way, this research report attempts to bring together some of the 
recent thinking about the moral rights and responsibilities of corporations in the literature on 
corporate citizenship, corporate social responsibility, business and society, and business ethics, and 
apply these directly to the research question: do corporations have a moral right and duty to 
influence public policy through lobbying? 
  
In Chapter Two, I seek to define lobbying and to present a case as to why it is an activity that is 
worth enquiring into, morally speaking. I consider in Chapter Three the proposition that corporations 
should be regarded as a type of moral person with moral rights and responsibilities equivalent to 
those of individual, natural persons, including civic or political rights: the right to free speech, the 
right to freedom of association, the right to petition government, and the right to due process. It is 
these rights that are being exercised when corporations lobby. In Chapter Four I will argue that a 
corporation’s political rights as a type of moral person and corporate citizen underpin its right to 
influence public policy through lobbing. It assesses the implications for individual political rights, 
specifically the right to political equality. Individual rights are compared with collectivist or 
communitarian approaches to political rights, policy-making, and democracy.  
 
Chapter Five focuses on the moral responsibilities of corporations and the ethics of corporate 
lobbying from the perspective of the Shareholder and the Stakeholder Theories of the Firm. The 
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limitations of these normative frameworks are taken into account in constructing a case for a 
normative Theory of the Firm as a Political Actor, with an associated moral obligation to seek to 
influence public policy. Chapter Six proposes a set of ethical principles to guide morally responsible 
lobbying. I conclude with an argument for the importance of ethical corporate lobbying to ensure 
that the resources and influence of powerful corporations are harnessed in service of the greater 
good, and the strengthening of democracy, and include pragmatic implications for policy governing 
corporate lobbying in countries like South Africa. 
  
 13 
CHAPTER 2   
WHAT IS LOBBYING AND WHY IS IT OF MORAL CONCERN? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter briefly considers the nature of lobbying, where it originated, and how it has come to be 
described and defined. Lobbying is an activity which has an inherently political complexion. It often 
evokes imagery of shady deals being done in smoke-filled rooms by dishonest businessman and 
corrupt politicians. This widespread perception of lobbying underpins public sentiment that 
corporate lobbying is not quite legitimate, and this moral skepticism about corporate lobbying is 
examined in the second part of the chapter. An alternative perspective on the morality of lobbying 
by corporations is also briefly discussed. 
 
What is Lobbying? 
Since this research is about the ethics of corporate lobbying it will be important to offer some 
definitions and descriptions of lobbying. Lobbying is a set of activities that are undertaken with the 
aim of changing public policy and legislation. Lobbying is one type of corporate political activity, 
which can also include campaign financing, hiring former public officials and regulators, litigation, 
and political advertising. This essay will confine itself to the ethics of lobbying by corporations and 
will not examine other forms of corporate political action. 
 
There are a number of different definitions and descriptions of lobbying used in the literature 
however for the purposes of this essay I will confine myself to the definition and description 
provided by Anastasiadis1 (2006: 14): 
Lobbying seeks to affect public policy by providing key stakeholders – notably policy makers 
– with specific information about preferences for policy or policy positions. It may involve 
                                                          
1
 As a lobbyist by profession, I find the definition and description by Anastasiasdis to capture the true essence 
and description of the practice of lobbying and advocacy. 
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providing information on the costs and benefits of different issue outcomes, or more 
broadly, attempting to set the terms of the debate and thus channel policy discussions in a 
favourable manner. Lobbying can challenge outcomes of decisions already made, through 
seeking to redefine the terms of the debate and thereby re-problematising undesirable 
outcomes, causing them to be revisited. The good provided is information. The ultimate 
target of lobbying input is the legislator or political decision maker. Lobbying involves a 
range of tactics, such as ‘direct’ or issue-specific lobbying; reporting research and survey 
results; commissioning research/think-tank research projects; testifying as expert witnesses 
and in hearings or before other government bodies; and supplying decision makers with 
position papers or technical reports. In addition to seeking desired policy outcomes, one 
goal of lobbying is to develop a strong reputation, so that decision-makers are inclined to 
trust the information provided and turn to the lobbying organization for information when 
developing or discussing policy or policy positions.  
 
Lobbying activities include monitoring, assessing, and commenting on proposed legislation, 
proposing legislative drafting, testifying at public hearings, and meeting public officials (Keffer and 
Hill, 1997: 1373); writing letters, memoranda, and submissions; serving on government advisory 
groups and regulatory drafting technical teams; presenting positions and arguments at conferences; 
commissioning regulatory impact assessments; public relations; sponsoring research and sharing 
such with policy-makers; and participating in industry associations (AccountAbility, 2005: 39). 
Lobbying reflects an intention on the part of a corporation to “enter the political arena to influence 
the shaping and reshaping of their regulatory environment” (Néron, 2010: 343), including 
influencing how regulators interpret, apply and enforce existing laws (SustainAbility, 2005: 5). The 
essence of lobbying is to change the law (Ostas, 2007: 33); to alter the regulatory framework and 
legal environment within which corporations exist. As the regulatory framework has expanded and 
become increasingly complex, impacting on more and more aspects of a corporation’s decisions and 
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activities, regulation and public policy has become a matter of material strategic concern for most 
corporations. The growing recognition of government’s powers vis-à-vis corporations has provided 
the impetus for increased corporate political action and lobbying as corporations try to reduce the 
costs that governments can impose on them (Anastasiadis, 2006: 2, and Ostas, 2007: 34). This 
implies that corporations undertake lobbying to defend and promote their own interests, which may 
or may not be the case. There may be additional or alternative reasons for corporations to seek to 
influence public policy, and these will be considered in this essay in addition to lobbying that is only 
aimed at lowering compliance costs. 
 
Throughout this essay, regulation will be used as a broad term that incorporates public policy, 
legislation, and regulation (often referred to as subordinate legislation). Regulation is defined as 
legally-binding constraints that are imposed by the state on private activity in order to promote and 
protect the public good (Hogan, Murphy, and Chari, 2008: 131). 
 
 “Some form of lobbying is as old as politics itself” - the right to petition government has a long 
history in Western legal tradition, appearing in the Magna Carta in 1215 (Woodstock Theological 
Centre, 2002: 25). US President Ulysses Grant famously coined the term ‘lobbyist’ after petitioners 
who would accost him in the lobby of the Willard Hotel close to the White House (Anastasiadis, 
2006: 8). Lobbying has been described as the world’s second-oldest profession. 
 
Why is Corporate Lobbying a Subject for Moral Enquiry?  
There does not appear to be a consensus in the extant literature as to whether corporate lobbying is 
a morally legitimate activity or not. Prevailing sentiment still seems to generally regard corporate 
lobbying as morally questionable, even “morally reprehensible” (Barker, 2008: 25). In some contexts, 
lobbying is treated with suspicion and maligned as unethical, immoral, and responsible for increasing 
cynicism about democracy (Ostas, 1997: 34). There is a commonly-held belief that efforts by 
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business to influence public policy are morally suspicious and illegitimate, and the discourse on 
lobbying typically uses negative language and imagery. According to Keffer and Hill, “… the word 
‘lobbying’ … evokes images of furtive influence peddlers lurking in the lobbies outside government 
offices … ready … to sacrifice the public welfare …” (1997: 161). 
 
Lobbying generally has an undesirable reputation because of concerns about privileged access to 
policy processes, and the abuse of corporate power at society’s expense (Bauer, 2014: 62). The 
history of corporate lobbying is tainted with corporations largely perceived to have engaged in 
lobbying to “defend the status quo … to the detriment of wider society” (AccountAbility, 2005: 17). 
Weber (1997: 73) argues that lobbying by businesses is tantamount to “special interests” exercising 
an undue influence in policy processes, while the interests of ordinary citizens do not receive the 
same attention from policy-makers. The “widespread and deep-seated” moral unease with 
corporate lobbying is that it seemingly allows the wealthy to shape the law to serve their 
(illegitimate) private interests rather than the public good (Ostas, 2007: 34-35).   
 
Alzola, in his 2013 paper titled “Corporate Dystopia: The Ethics of Corporate Political Spending”, 
paints a bleak picture of the ethics of corporate lobbying.  Alzola’s argument contains an analysis of 
consequentialist and rights-based arguments both for and against lobbying: in brief, lobbying, on 
consequentialist grounds, is unethical because it is linked to deleterious outcomes such as 
corruption, regulatory capture, and corporatism; and lobbying is also unethical because it 
jeopardizes individual rights to equality and the practice of democracy (2013: 414). Corporate 
lobbying arguably undermines political equality and the concept of “one person, one vote” (Alzola, 
2013: 406); and it allows “wealthy firms without any democratic mandate [to] attempt to directly 
influence democratically-elected policy-makers,” (Bauer, 2014: 65). 
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Yet, despite these misgivings there are few countries that explicitly regulate lobbying (Hogan, 
Murphy, and Chari, 2008: 129). In South Africa, policy-makers and legislators are regulated through 
rules requiring that they publicly disclose their business interests and register all gifts that they 
receive. Lobbying itself is not regulated in South Africa, although corporations (and other 
organisations) are subject to the laws outlawing bribery and corruption, as well as those regulating 
potential conflicts of interest in respect of corporate entertainment and hospitality. Much of the 
regulation of lobbying that does exist, such as that in the European Union, focuses on transparency 
and public disclosure in respect of who is lobbying who and on what particular policy issues.  It is left 
to the many of codes of conduct on lobbying that have emerged, some imposed by governments 
and some emerging as a form of self-regulation, to attempt to codify ethical lobbying conduct (see 
for example the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada’s “Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct” 
(2015), the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Australia’s “Lobbying Code of Conduct 
(2013), and the US Association of Government Relations Professionals’ 2010 Code of Ethics). 
 
One can say that lobbying is not “inherently evil”, rather as Hamilton and Hoch argue, lobbying “is a 
socially responsible activity … which needs to be restrained by ethical standards.” (1997: 120). 
Furthermore, Hamilton and Hoch have suggested that not only is corporate lobbying morally 
permissible, it is a moral requirement of ethically responsible corporations. They note: “In order to 
fulfill their social responsibilities (as well as promote their self-interest), corporates ought2 to lobby” 
(1997: 118).   
 
What are the primary ethical questions raised by corporate lobbying? The Woodstock Theological 
Centre’s 2002 study of ethics in lobbying in the United States started by asking which moral 
principles govern the practice of lobbying? In my research report, the ethics of corporate lobbying 
will be considered from the perspective of the moral rights and moral responsibilities of 
                                                          
2
 Emphasis mine. 
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corporations, and intersection of these rights and responsibilities with those of other moral entities. 
This approach is based more in the tradition of Kantian ethics and non-consequentialist 
perspectives, although where especially pertinent some of the consequentialist arguments around 
the ethics of corporate conduct will be referenced.  
 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this research undertaking is to attempt to answer the 
following research question: Do corporations have a moral right and duty to influence public policy 
through lobbying? 
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CHAPTER 3   
ARE CORPORATIONS A TYPE OF MORAL PERSON? 
 
Introduction 
Are corporations moral persons? If they are, what moral rights do they have? In this chapter I will 
examine these questions. The claim that will be defended is that corporations are a type of moral 
person with similar moral rights and responsibilities as those of human beings.  
 
Corporations, companies, and business firms are collectives of individuals who have joined together 
for a common enterprise, typically a commercial or profit-making enterprise. They are formal 
entities granted legal recognition by the law and a licence to operate by society. Once established, 
corporations can exist in perpetuity, while individual members come and go over time. Corporations 
are regarded as single entities and as persons under the law. The moral status of corporations is a 
central question in Business Ethics, which is not surprising given that corporations, and other similar 
forms of organisations, play a profound and prominent role in modern life. Corporations are the 
basic unit of modern economies (Solomon, 1991 in Marcoux, 2009: 4): every day across the globe 
millions of people interact with and are affected by corporations on a daily basis: as employees 
working in them, as consumers purchasing from them. While corporations are a valid and relevant 
unit of analysis for moral philosophy, the moral status of corporations is not yet settled. 
 
The debate within business ethics as to whether or not corporations are moral persons with similar 
moral rights and duties accorded to natural persons is ongoing: can corporations actually be 
considered to have moral agency as collective yet singular entities separate from the individuals in 
the corporation? Marcoux (2009: 4) proclaims this debate to be the “main conversation” in Business 
Ethics, and Moore (1999: 229) states that this a fundamental question within the subject which is yet 
to be definitively answered given its inherent complexity. Philosophers differ in their analysis of the 
moral status of corporations. There are those who argue that corporations are a form of moral 
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person, which enjoy moral rights and duties similar to those possessed by natural persons. Others 
argue that corporations are not moral entities in any sense, and cannot be held morally responsible 
for anything that they do.  
 
Corporations and Moral Agency 
Much of the debate about the moral agency of corporations centres on the metaphysics of the 
corporation, and just what sort of entity a corporation is: is it a single moral entity or is it an 
aggregation of many separate individuals? The ontology of corporations seems to be central to 
arguments about whether or not corporations are moral agents. From an ontological perspective, 
the moral status of the corporation turns on the extent to which the corporation possesses the 
intrinsic qualities that are required for moral agency. Therefore, it is necessary to answer the 
following question:  What intrinsic properties are required of an entity for it to be a moral agent? 
This is a fundamental question in moral philosophy and since only a limited response is possible a 
comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this essay.  
 
Meyers (1993: 253) argues that there are four essential elements of moral agency: the ability to 
form a rational intent; the ability to originate action in pursuit of that intent; the ability to engage in 
moral relationships within a moral community; and the singular nature of the entity such that 
responsibility can be ascribed to that specific entity. Rational intent is fundamental to moral agency. 
A moral agent must have the capability of forming a rational intention and acting purposively on that 
intention: to be capable of both rational thought and deed. Intentionality can be understood as “a 
deliberate disposition to do something in a certain manner or to realise a state of affairs. An 
intentional act involves both beliefs and desires and a self-conscious tendency to act in a certain way 
to realize an outcome based on these beliefs and desires,” (Werhane, 1985: 36). Rationality can be 
understood as “the pursuit of purposes with careful attention to ends and means, alternatives and 
consequences, risks and opportunities,” (Goodpaster, 1983: 7), and it is a prerequisite for 
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intentionality according to Velasquez (1983: 2). In order for an entity to be a moral agent, that 
entity’s actions must not only cause a particular outcome – Outcome X – that entity must also have 
intended to cause Outcome X through its actions. It is on this basis that moral responsibility can be 
ascribed to that entity (Surber, 1983: 68). Thus, causality is a necessary but not a sufficient element 
of moral responsibility: a lightning strike may cause a fatal injury to a person but it makes no sense 
to think about lightning as having moral responsibility for the fatality. Rational intent must be added 
to causality to give rise to moral responsibility for the results of an action (Velasquez, 1983: 2-3).   
 
Do corporations possess these qualities of moral agency? Those authors who assert the moral 
agency and moral responsibility of corporations argue that corporations do indeed possess these 
qualities (see for example Peter French (1979), Patricia Werhane (1985), and Pettit (2007)). What is 
the basis of their arguments? 
 
There is a strong case that the internal decision-making structures and procedures of corporations 
transform the intentions and actions of multiple individuals into collective, corporate intention and 
action. This is the argument that is advanced by French (1979) in “The Corporation as a Moral 
Person”, as well as by Werhane (1985) in “Persons, Rights, and Corporations”. The essence of a 
corporation is such that the individual members thereof act within defined roles and according to 
prescribed rules to produce an “intricate web” of collective, corporate behaviour (Werhane, 1985: 
39). Corporations are fundamentally defined by their organisational structure and allocation of 
functions to specific jobs which have specific decision-making rights and duties attached thereto and 
it is these job specifications which define what counts as “action on behalf of the corporation” 
(Werhane, 1985: 33). Peter French (1979: 212) calls this set of roles, rules, and procedures the 
“Corporate Internal Decision-Making Structure” and it is this structure that gives a corporation its 
capability to form rational intentions and to act on these, in other words its moral agency.  
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The corporation and its Corporate Internal Decision-making (CID) structure persist over time as 
individuals come and go, and it is this structure that makes the corporation more than just an 
aggregation of individual intentions and actions. The argument put forward by French resonates 
with the experience of those who work in organisations (whether corporations or other sorts of 
collectives): there is a real sense in which a myriad of individual values, beliefs, and goals become 
synthesised and subordinated into collective decisions and actions (French, 1979: 212). Garrett 
(1989: 536) argues that the “reciprocal adjustment of individual intentions and plans that take place 
in such organizations yields a corporate intentionality that is more like human intentionality than it is 
like the efficient causality that might be attributed to blindly operating social wholes such as 
markets.” 
 
Organisational decision-making processes, organisational roles, corporate governance documents, 
founding memoranda of incorporation or constitutions, make manifest the organisation’s values and 
goals, and these tend to persist regardless of the “transient self-interest of individual owners, 
directors, and managers” (French, 1979: 214).  
 
Generally, most of us tend to perceive and regard corporations as single entities. Our discourse on 
corporate conduct refers to ‘Apple’, ‘Google’, ‘BP’, or ‘MTN’ as cohesive single units which are more 
than the sum of their individual parts. Few of us know the names of the chief executive officers or 
the board of directors of these corporations. There is something intrinsically different about a 
collection of individuals who are members of a corporation (or a trade union, university, or charity 
for that matter) and a collection of individuals who have come together accidentally in a queue, for 
example, or even football fans who have come together for a short period to watch their team play a 
match (Goodpaster, 1983: 10). The intrinsic difference between these sorts of collectives lies in the 
existence and functioning of the CID Structure (Goodpaster, 1983: 10), for the individuals who 
constitute the corporation act within their roles in the corporation, as members of the corporation, 
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in accordance with the CID Mechanism, and not as separate individuals (Werhane, 1985: 61). 
Corporate decisions are taken in a “formal or anonymous” manner in line with the internal rules of 
the corporation (Werhane, 1985: 33) and the acts performed by individual human beings who are 
constituent members of the corporation are rendered as corporate acts (French, 1979: 214) 
performed for and in the name of the corporation (Goodpaster, 1983: 3), rather than individual acts.  
 
Understanding corporations in this way - as formal collective entities capable of rational action – 
provides the grounds for arguing that corporations are moral agents which have the right sorts of 
capabilities to be appropriately regarded as a type of moral person (French, 1979: 215). Werhane 
(1985, 35) criticizes those who have challenged this proposition on the basis that corporations 
clearly cannot suffer physical harm or sickness, get married or divorced, on the grounds that this is a 
straw man fallacy. Werhane’s rebuttal is that French and others do not argue that corporations are 
the same as biological persons, but rather that it is useful and not unreasonable to regard 
corporations as a type of person, and that as such the analogy is appropriate and intelligible.  
 
Yet there is a formidable and appealing counter-argument to the corporation as moral person 
position that has been put forward by a number of authors including Manuel Velasquez (1983). The 
essence of the case argued by Velasquez is that corporations have no intrinsic ability to form 
intentions or act thereon independently from the individual natural persons who constitute the 
corporation; its directors, managers, and employees. Only natural persons can form intent and can 
act, and corporations have no autonomous, independent capability to do so (Moore, 1999: 335). A 
corporation cannot act without a natural person acting on its behalf (Ewin, 1991: 749). A corporation 
is nothing more than an aggregation of the values, beliefs, intentions, and actions of these 
individuals. Beyond this, a corporation is only a legal creation with legal rights and duties. Velasquez 
(1983: 6) argues that corporations cannot think and act autonomously as corporations do not 
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possess a mind or body qua corporations: any and all intention and action originates in the minds 
and bodies of the individual people constituting the corporation.  
 
Velasquez does not accept the argument that the CID Structure transforms individual intentions and 
actions into collective, corporate intentions and actions. Ranken (1987) provides a justification for 
this position: Ranken argues that while the CID structure does exist, it is itself the product of the 
decisions and actions of the corporation’s individual members who over a period of time have 
institutionalised their values and beliefs into those of the corporation. The CID structure was the 
result of a process driven by natural persons within the corporation; it did not occur autonomously 
(Ranken, 1987: 634, 636). Therefore, the corporation does not have any independent moral status 
distinct from the individual human persons that constitute the corporation (Ranken, 1987: 633).  
 
Another reason for Velasquez’s rejection of corporate moral agency is based on his conception of 
moral responsibility. Velasquez (1983: 2) equates moral responsibility with the attribution of blame 
or praise for conduct that has taken place; he draws a link between moral responsibility and just 
liability to blame and punishment (1983: 4). Moral responsibility is attributed to an agent only for 
those actions that originate in the agent insofar as the action derived from the agent’s intentions 
and from the same agent’s physical movements; and because corporations cannot act 
autonomously, corporate acts do not originate in the corporation but in its members, and as such 
one of the necessary elements of responsibility cannot be satisfied (Velasquez, 1983: 4,6). If the 
corporation itself did not act, then moral responsibility cannot be attributed to the corporation. Only 
the individual member of the corporation acted, and only the individual member can be held 
responsible and be fairly blamed and punished (1983: 7). Blame and punishment cannot be fairly 
attributed to a collective, as a collective “has no soul or body” it cannot be punished (Moore, 1999: 
336-337). For Velasquez this implies that corporations are not moral agents to whom moral 
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responsibility may be intelligibly attached, and it makes no sense to consider corporations qua 
corporations to be a sort of moral person.  
 
Is Velasquez right in his complete rejection of the notion that corporations are intrinsically nothing 
more than the sum of the natural persons who constitute it, that corporations cannot be regarded as 
moral persons? Some writers who, like Velasquez, argue against corporations as moral agents 
express concern that French’s conception of corporations absolves individual persons from any 
moral responsibility for their wrongful acts conducted in the name of the corporation. But this is a 
false dilemma: as a number of writers have argued that collective and individual responsibility do 
not need to be mutually exclusive (see for example Meyers (1993: 257-258), and Gibson (1985)). 
Corporations can be regarded as having moral responsibility for corporate actions and the individual 
constituent members of the corporation can also be held morally responsible for their conduct too. 
Indeed, many commercial laws and regulations recognise this duality of responsibility for wrong 
doing3.  
 
The opposing views about the moral personhood of corporations represented respectively by French 
and Velasquez rest on the metaphysical nature of what sort of entity a corporation is. It is 
commonly-accepted that corporations are juristic persons, but the ontology of corporations is not 
yet settled (Marcoux, 2009: 5), and both sides of the debate have compelling arguments for their 
positions (Dubbink and Smith, 2011: 224). As a result, it may be necessary to build a case for the 
moral personhood of corporations on a different foundation, on a conception of moral responsibility 
that does not rest on moral agency.  
 
  
                                                          
3
 For example, inter alia the Competition Act, Act No. 89 of 1998, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, Act 38 
of 2001, and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, Act 33 of 
2004. 
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Corporate Moral Responsibility 
Werhane (1985: 47) poses an important and pragmatic question: is it necessary that the ontology of 
corporations is settled to discuss corporations in moral terms?  Surber (1983), Gibson (1985), and 
Dubbink and Smith (2011), offer a convincing understanding of corporate moral responsibility that 
sidesteps the ontological status of corporations. Goodpaster (1982: 103) suggests that debates 
about the ontology of corporations are likely to be lost on the average person. He argues that the 
“fertility” of the moral person analogy lies in legitimating the use of ethical categories for guiding 
corporate actions.   
 
Velasquez focuses on responsibility for the purposes of fairly allocating blame, and as such, his 
conception of responsibility tends to be retrospective, focused on past acts. Surber (1983: 68) 
explains that an ‘agent-intentionality’ model of moral responsibility defines and determines moral 
responsibility by linking an agent’s rational intentions and actions to the outcomes thereof. Gibson 
(1995: 761) compares this approach to that of criminal law which similarly hinges on the intention of 
the person committing the unlawful act. Yet, this approach fails to take into consideration the harm 
that corporations may unintentionally cause and the benefit of holding the corporation both morally 
and legally culpable for such unintended harm (Gibson, 1995: 762, Surber, 1983, 78). There are 
many examples of unintended deleterious outcomes of corporate action or inaction (Gibson, 1995: 
763): such as the environmental damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010 or the 
deaths of two people when the Murray & Roberts pedestrian bridge over the Johannesburg M1 
freeway collapsed in 2015. In both examples these corporations may be regarded as blameworthy 
on the basis of their negligence, which is a standard typically applied in tort law4 rather than criminal 
law (Gibson, 1995: 763). Gibson (1995: 763) and Surber (1983: 78) both use this argument to 
conclude that it is possible to establish moral liability in the absence of intent; to free the notion of 
moral responsibility from its dependence on the rational, intentional agent.    
                                                          
4
 In South Africa, tort law is known as the law of delict; it covers inter alia issues related to negligence.  
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Thus, moral responsibility can also be understood as an obligation to avoid or minimise harm, to 
exercise a duty of care towards other moral entities which may be potentially harmed by a 
corporation’s behaviour. This more forward-looking conception of moral responsibility implies that 
one entity has an obligation to another entity because of a relationship between the two entities 
(French, 1979: 210) which arises because of the first entity’s ability to have profound moral effects 
on other entities which extend beyond contractual and legal obligations (Meyers, 1993: 252, 256).  
 
French (1979: 211) argues that reducing corporations to only juristic persons fails to provide an 
adequate account of the nature of the moral obligations that a corporation has towards these other 
entities. This dimension of responsibility, respect for the impact of one’s conduct on others and the 
adjustment of one’s plans accordingly, is not completely captured by the law; yet it is society’s 
expectation that corporations will engage in this kind of ethical self-restraint as moral persons not as 
merely legal persons. Especially as corporations, through their CID structures, do possess the ability 
to consider and adjust their planned actions if these carry the risk of harm to others (Moore, 1999: 
333).  
 
Corporations as Members of a Moral Community 
Velasquez’s thesis that “corporations are not responsible for anything they do” appears to be at 
odds with widespread moral intuitions about corporations (Werhane, 1985: 41). Velasquez (1985: 
12) tends to dismiss these intuitions as nothing more than a convenient shorthand that people use in 
lieu of knowing the names of the responsible individuals. But, can such pervasive and persistent 
moral sentiments about the nature of corporations really be so readily dismissed?  
 
My contention is that there is a sound philosophical basis for the enduring and widespread moral 
belief that a corporation is a sort of moral person. This foundation is provided by social contract 
theory and the answer to the question of why societies continue to grant corporations legal status as 
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juristic persons, which entitles corporations to receive many benefits. Democratic societies have not 
chosen to repeal the legislation that allows for the creation and continuation of corporations; 
indeed, corporate law reform has continued to codify the responsibilities of corporations in relation 
to society. Werhane (1985: 60) argues convincingly that the legal status granted to incorporation is 
predicated on a moral foundation as legal rights can only be justified if they have a moral basis. 
Arguably then the continued legislative backing for corporations reflects a moral norm about the 
nature of corporations, which is that corporations are more than merely legal persons, they are also 
moral persons.  Moore (1999: 339) makes an interesting point about the evolving jurisprudence in 
respect of corporations: he proposes that developments in corporate case law reflect “a 
philosophical basis which accepts all the requirements of the corporation as being morally 
responsible.” Moore (1999: 339) concludes that the law has accepted that corporations are 
responsible in a causal sense and a moral sense; and that this is a more accurate reflection of how 
most people interpret the world around them.  
 
Furthermore, to argue that corporations are only legal and social constructs is to ignore that legal 
and social constructs are themselves based on prevailing normative beliefs and frameworks. The act 
of incorporation is more than just a legal action, it is a process whereby individuals come together to 
pursue joint goals and by which individual values, desires and beliefs become intertwined, altered, 
and formalised in service of these joint goals. Incorporation makes manifest corporate moral 
responsibility: through a corporation’s organisational structure, its control systems, business 
practices, brand, corporate culture, and its legal personality (Goodpaster, 1983: 10, 14). 
Incorporation is the process whereby an aggregate becomes a collective; it is the act whereby 
society alters the very nature of the collective. Indeed, in creating corporations, society has created 
a new “locus of moral responsibility” (Garrett, 1989: 541). 
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My proposition is that, in democratic societies, legislation tends to reflect the implicit social contract 
between the members of those societies. This includes legislation that gives corporations’ legal 
status as persons through the act of incorporation.  The social contract sets out the rules by which 
members of society agree to operate and as such it provides the foundation of moral obligations for 
moral agents in that society (Scherer and Palazzo, 2004: 15). Social contract theory implies that 
because a corporation is licenced by society to operate it has implicit commitments to that society 
(Werhane, 1985: 46), and that the corporation exists in a moral community with moral 
responsibilities towards other entities within the same community (Meyers, 1993: 254, 255). In 
market-based economies, corporations are granted the right to determine how to make use of their 
property, where to invest it, what goods and services to produce and market, how much labour 
versus machinery to use, and how much surplus to reinvest or distribute to shareholders (Dubbink 
and Smith, 2011: 226). These decisions have profound implications for the society in which the 
corporation operates and can have significant positive and negative consequences for society. Just 
some factors that might be impacted include income levels, inequality, skills, pollution, congestion, 
technology and innovation, inflation, government revenue, foreign trade, and economic growth.  
There are approximately fifty transnational corporations whose annual revenues exceed those of the 
economies of nation states: for example, if Wal-Mart were a country it would be the world’s 25th 
largest economy; and Apple would be the world’s 19th largest economy, larger than the economy of 
Switzerland. It is inconceivable that such powerful entities are to be treated as amoral institutions, 
mere legal creatures that cannot be held morally accountable for the impact of their conduct. 
Dubbink and Smith (2011: 224) make a compelling case for the political necessity of corporate moral 
responsibility as corporations “have become the dominant social actors of our time”.  
 
The widespread acceptance of the role of corporations, and the legal privileges granted to them in 
market-based economic systems, rests on an expectation that corporations will respect certain 
moral principles and will act as moral agents (Dubbink and Smith, 2011: 227). Wesley Cragg (2002: 
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132) articulates the connection between corporate moral personhood and legal personhood through 
the social contract theory. Cragg (2002: 132) states that corporations are legal creations which 
would cease to exist without the active agreement of governments, and the publics for which they 
legislate. Therefore, the existence of corporations involves a contract between governments and 
corporations; and given that legislation is an intentional action, this contract is not accidental. The 
legal framework that allows corporations to exist and operate is reviewed, reinterpreted and 
evaluated on an ongoing basis in legislatures and in courts; thus, corporations do not exist outside of 
society (Cragg, 2002: 132). A moral community would not easily agree to create a legal framework 
for corporations only for the generation of private benefit without proper regard for the public 
benefits or harms resulting from corporate actions (Cragg, 2002: 132-133).  
 
What this strongly indicates is corporations are not just a legal construct, corporations are also a 
societal construct, a product of an implicit contract concluded by members of a moral community, 
and thus have moral status in relation to fulfilling their obligations under that social contract. It does 
not seem reasonable that society would support the creation of powerful entities whose conduct 
can directly and indirectly impact on the wellbeing of billions of human beings without imposing 
some minimum requirements that such conduct needs to be in line with moral precepts and norms.  
 
The perils of adopting the view that corporations “are not responsible for anything they do” are too 
great. To regard a corporation as an instrument that can be used by a group of individuals to 
generate private gain for themselves is to ignore the moral implications of the immense public costs 
that corporations can impose on society in pursuit of private gain. Patricia Werhane (1985: 43-44) 
rejects the “Corporation as Machine” metaphor on the grounds that it fails to provide an adequate 
account of the nature of the modern corporation which often engages in non-mechanistic, and non-
economic actions, and it would also imply ending all philosophical enquiry about the status and 
purpose of corporations. There is also a case to be made that tools are designed and created by 
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human beings who can imbue them with specific values, and these values become embedded in the 
tools. Thus, it can be argued that because the concept of a corporation was conceived and created 
by human beings, corporations reflect certain embedded values and moral characteristics 
significantly similar to those of their human creators. Corporations cannot be dispensed with as 
mere legal fictions without moral rights and responsibilities. Consider the scenario where a 
corporation’s legal registration or charter is withdrawn, perhaps temporarily5, and the corporation 
continues to operate: during this time period it can argued that the corporation no longer exists as a 
legal entity, yet we would continue to hold it morally responsible for its actions during this time. The 
argument proposed by Ewin (1991: 749) that a corporation’s moral personality is exhausted by its 
legal personality, that corporations are simply legal tools created to achieve economic goals, and 
that morality subsists in the people who use the tool and not in the tool itself, is subject to 
challenge.  
 
Corporations as Moral Persons 
I have argued that corporations have an inherent capability to form intentions and act thereon, and 
to apply moral principles in their decision-making. I have also argued that the legal personality 
granted to corporations is based on society’s moral norms and is sanctioned through an implicit 
social contract. This social contract imposes moral duties on corporations which are not restricted to 
legal requirements, and as such they have also been granted certain moral rights. Notwithstanding 
this, one might still raise the worry as to whether corporations are moral persons given that they are 
different from human beings. In other words, the analogy between corporations and persons under 
the law has raised the question of whether corporations “are sufficiently like individual human 
beings that they can be considered to be moral as well as legal persons and thus have moral rights”, 
(Werhane, 1985: 34). 
 
                                                          
5
 The regulatory authority for registering corporations in South Africa is the Company and Intellectual Property Commission 
(CIPC). It regularly suspends the registration of those corporations who fail to submit their regulatory returns. 
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Arnold (2006: 280) writes that “(d)espite its many critics, French’s theory of corporate persons 
remains the single most influential account of the metaphysical status of corporations.” French’s 
seminal paper on corporate moral persons takes the view that the concept of personhood is rooted 
in the law, and cites Roman law in terms of which natural persons themselves are legal creations 
without existence outside of the law (1979: 208). French’s review of the jurisprudence of juristic 
persons leads him to conclude that “biological existence is not essentially associated with the 
concept of a person” (1979: 210).  
 
Corporations are not biological persons, and I am sympathetic to the worry that acknowledging 
corporations as moral persons may lead some to argue that the rights of corporations can trump the 
rights of natural persons. Yet, I am of the view that regarding corporations as a type of moral person 
is not simply some shorthand that we employ to discuss corporate conduct, and that there are 
compelling ethical reasons to treat corporations as more than the sum of their parts, to regard 
corporations having a moral personality. Corporations have produced immense harm, and immense 
good; they have become the pre-eminent institution in modern society economically, politically, and 
culturally. If we want to hold corporations morally accountable for their conduct, and the 
consequences of their conduct, then we need to deem them moral persons with moral obligations 
to others, and moral rights in return. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DO CORPORATE CORPORATIONS HAVE A MORAL RIGHT TO LOBBY? 
 
Introduction 
As moral persons, corporations “have whatever privileges, rights and duties as are, in the normal 
course of affairs, accorded to normal persons” (French 1979: 207). If it accepted that corporations 
are a particular kind of moral person, what moral rights can they claim? The moral claims that others 
may make on corporations dominates the extant literature; but there appears to be very little 
discussion about the specific sorts of moral rights that are afforded to corporations.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that a corporation may claim political rights as a type of moral person and 
as a corporate citizen, and that it is these political rights that underpin a corporation’s right to 
influence public policy through lobbying.  
 
Corporate Political Rights 
Rights can be understood as moral claims against other moral agents (Werhane, 1985: 15) and while 
the rights of corporations are set out in law, these laws are justified on the basis that they are 
grounded in general moral principles. May (2015) explains that moral rights are those that affect 
moral duties, freedoms, privileges, and immunities. Corporations have various rights by virtue of 
their status as a type of moral person. These include economic rights such as property ownership, 
procedural rights such as the right to administrative justice, and political rights such as freedom of 
speech and freedom of association (Werhane, 1985: 22, and May, 2015). Society has granted 
corporations extensive economic rights about how to deploy capital, what to investment in, and 
what to produce. Dubbink and Smith (2011) make a convincing case that these corporate decisions 
are of an inherently political nature; they are also inherently moral in nature since these corporate 
decisions have enormous implications for millions, if not billions, of people who may be far removed 
from the corporate decision-making process and not protected by law if their rights are infringed as 
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a consequence. An interest-based theory of rights proposes that an entity will have rights whenever 
its interests are sufficiently significant to create duties for others (Jones, 2014: 11). Corporations 
clearly have significant interests in their property:  the property rights granted to corporations are 
both legal and moral rights, for property rights restrict the moral options available to other moral 
agents in respect of their behaviour towards the corporation (May, 2015). There is a case to be 
made, beyond the ambit of this essay, that property rights are inherently political in nature, and are 
not just economic or commercial rights. 
 
Political rights are those rights that govern decision-making in the public sphere about the public 
interest and good (Werhane, 1985: 22) as well as directing the decisions about the rules by which 
these decisions will be made. Political rights protect the right to participate in political processes and 
circumscribe the authority of the state vis-à-vis citizens and other persons, and typically include the 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, the right to petition the 
government, the right to administrative justice, due process, and a fair trial. This group of rights is 
fundamental in a democratic dispensation and is often enshrined in constitutional frameworks and 
jurisprudence.  
 
What will the political rights of corporations look like in the context of say, the legal framework of a 
country? Let us examine this question using the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa expressly incorporates corporations – as juristic persons 
- into the ambit of the Bill of Rights in sub-sections 8(2) and 8(4). These are legal rights; however, the 
Bill of Rights is as much a normative document as it is a legal one, and it is universal moral principles 
that inform the categorical and fundamental character of the rights contained therein. Moral rights 
are categorical principles that serve as benchmarks for evaluating legal rights (Werhane, 1985: 8). 
Political rights are a sub-set of moral rights pertaining to the public or civic domain and include 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to privacy, and the right to due process 
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(Werhane, 1985: 22). The South African Constitution grants corporations rights to freedom of 
expression; freedom of association; just administrative action; access to courts; as well as property 
rights. There is a strong case to be argued that the South African Constitution represents an explicit 
social contract because of the extensive consultation and public participation that shaped its 
drafting. Thus, South Africa’s social contract grants corporations, together with other types of juristic 
persons, certain fundamental rights which are both legal and normative in character. This position 
has been upheld by judgments of the superior courts which affirm that corporations can indeed 
claim the protection of these rights (Contract Employment Contractors (Pty) Ltd v Motor Industry 
Bargaining Council and Others, 2012:8).   
 
Since the transition to a democratic political dispensation in South Africa in the beginning of the 
1990s, stakeholder and public participation has been a characteristic feature of policy and legislative 
processes. A widespread and universal norm of participative policymaking has prevailed, and been 
codified into legislation. Arguably this moral standard about democratic governance reflects a 
considered and deliberate move away from the exclusionary character of Apartheid and an embrace 
of the inclusionary character of the mass democratic movement against the Apartheid regime. This 
moral norm recognizes both individual and collective participants in consultative mechanisms and 
processes: for example, public hearings in Parliament on proposed legislation typically include 
representations from both individuals and organisations, including corporations. South African moral 
norms recognize the right of groups, collectives, and juristic persons, to political participation.  
 
Corporations are the subject of moral claims by society, governments, and various stakeholder 
groups. In some instances, legislation and regulation have codified these moral claims; but not 
always, and not always comprehensively. These moral claims can be aggregated together under the 
heading of corporate social responsibility or corporate citizenship; and extend beyond compliance 
with regulatory requirements to include moral responsibilities to consider and manage the impact of 
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corporate actions on society and the environment. These moral claims drive public policy and 
legislative agendas, at both international and national levels. Arguably, corporations have the right 
to participate in the political processes translating these moral claims into regulatory standards: 
regulatory standards that limit their legal rights and duties and directly influence their ability to 
exercise their property rights and operate autonomously without undue interference from the state. 
The right is fair administrative action and is enshrined in the South African Constitution, for example, 
and further codified in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. From the foregoing then one 
could say that prima facie corporations have the right to lobby government regarding public policy, 
legislation, and regulation, where such lobbying involves the exercising of political rights: freedom of 
speech, right to petition government, and the right to administrative justice. But can this view and 
position be sustained? 
 
Does a Corporate Right to Lobby Compromise Individual Rights? 
A rights-based argument for corporate lobbying pays no heed to the consequences of corporate 
lobbying, whatever these may be, whether positive or negative. A rights-based argument in support 
of a corporation’s lobbying is open to attack on the basis that in exercising this right, corporations 
are infringing on the rights of individuals to political equality. This is the line taken by Alzola (2013) in 
his challenge to the moral legitimacy of corporate political spending. I will review Alzola’s main 
arguments to identify the rights-based challenges to my proposition that corporations do enjoy the 
right to engage in lobbying. 
 
Alzola’s (2013) consideration of the ethics of corporate lobbying contains an analysis of 
consequentialist and rights-based arguments both for and against lobbying. Alzola’s argument is that 
the moral wrongness of corporate lobbying is not because of its potentially harmful consequences, 
but rather that it infringes the rights of individuals (2013: 414).  On consequentialist ground lobbying 
is considered unethical because it produces deleterious outcomes including corruption, regulatory 
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capture, and corporatism. These are claims that can be tested through empirical analysis. At the 
outset, Alzola acknowledges that his criticism of corporate political activity is based on the legal 
framework for this activity in the United States, and that he purposefully excludes corporate political 
activity related to the promotion of human rights in other jurisdictions, as well as political activity by 
other types of organized collectives. The reason for a detailed look at Alzola’s thinking is that his 
argument against corporate political activity is grounded on non-consequentialist foundations, and is 
a more appropriate counterpoint to the rights-based argument in favour of corporate lobbying that I 
am seeking to present in this essay.  
 
One of Alzola’s (2013: 406) central claims is that corporate lobbying erodes the essential meaning of 
political equality. Political equality requires that individuals should have an equal opportunity to 
influence the formation of laws (Alzola, 2013: 407). The essence of “one person, one vote” is that 
votes carry equal weight in the electoral process irrespective of the resources an individual has at his 
or her disposal (Alzola, 2013: 407). Corporate political activity gives corporations, by virtue of their 
disproportionate resources, the ability to exercise disproportionate influence in the political process: 
in his view “democracy and equality should not be subordinated to property,” (Alzola, 2013: 407). 
Furthermore, Alzola (2013: 407) contends that the use of corporate resources in the political system 
is also perhaps unfair because it amounts to an inappropriate blurring of private and public spheres. 
The moral principles for adjudicating fairness in “the market” are not the same as in “the political 
system”; and lobbying is an unfair extension of private interests into the public sphere. To express 
this point about the distinction between the private and public spheres in terms of the law and 
market we would say that the law has the backing of state force whereas the market operates on 
voluntary exchange (Ostas, 2007: 47).  
 
It is important to note that Alzola highlights a tension that exists between two fundamental moral 
rights, the right to equality and the right to liberty (exemplified by the right to free speech). Political 
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equality requires that there are equal opportunities to influence political processes, which is why the 
cornerstone of liberal democracy is one person, one vote (Alzola, 2013: 407). Alzola (2013: 408-409) 
proposes that the right to free speech is not unfettered and it can be legitimately restricted for the 
sake of equality; as a corporation’s right to free speech gives it an unfair advantage in the political 
arena it needs to be limited to ensure that citizens have equal opportunities for political influence.  
 
Alzola’s second line of attack on corporate political rights comes from his rejection of the proposition 
that corporations are single moral agents with a separate identity to their constituent members. By 
Alzola’s account it follows that there are no corporate moral rights at all, and corporations cannot 
claim a moral right to freedom of speech. So when corporations engage in lobbying, it is the political 
views of individual corporate members that are being represented. According to him (2013: 410), 
this violates the individual rights of other members of the corporation, shareholders and employees, 
unless they have consented to the lobbying.  Failure to obtain their consent implies that that 
members of the corporation have been unjustly compelled to support a particular political stance 
with which they may disagree (Alzola, 2013: 412).  
 
There are a number of possible challenges to Alzola’s argument against corporate political rights. His 
arguments are rooted in the particularities of the US political system (which he himself 
acknowledges), where liberal democracy is well entrenched and where a specific discourse about 
“free enterprise” is prevalent. His argument may not hold as firmly in other political systems, where 
democracy is still emerging, and in societies that hold different norms about the role of corporations 
and the role of the state, and a different political economy prevails. I will elaborate further on this 
point below. 
 
Alzola (413) makes the untenable claim that “the economic man and the citizen are for all intents 
and purposes two different individuals”, as if the economic sphere can be separated from the 
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political sphere and the market from the law. Such a separation is an entirely artificial one, and is not 
reflective of reasonable understandings of society and political economy; it is also not helpful in 
assessing the morality of corporate political conduct.  To imply such a separation of spheres implies 
that corporations are apolitical, a claim that does not hold in modern economies. Alzola (412) 
himself states that corporations operate for the purpose of creating value for all their stakeholders; 
a process that requires a consideration of public and social goods and is an inherently political 
exercise. Néron (2009: 335) argues that the “theoretical understandings of corporate roles and 
responsibilities have been obfuscated by a historically developed de-politicization of the corporation 
in which there is a clear separation between the economic sphere and the political sphere” each 
with their own different sources of legitimacy, and that “such a separation is normatively and 
empirically untenable”. It is precisely this apolitical paradigm that allows Alzola to wrongly assert 
that economic man and political man are separate entities.  
 
Is the threat to the principle of consent valid? If the proposition that corporations are single entities 
separate from their members is accepted, which I do accept, the question does not arise. As Pettit 
(2007: 184) credibly argues in his essay on “Responsibility Incorporated”, corporate decisions are not 
a simple “majoritarian or non-majoritarian function of the corresponding attitudes among 
individuals” and such decisions are “functionally independent of the corresponding” decision of 
individual, constituent members. The corporation lobbies in its own interests, and it is not 
unreasonable to believe that there is a coincidence of interests between the corporation qua 
corporation, its shareholders, and its employees. Alzola’s concern is that a corporation’s political 
preferences may be at odds with those of its individual members, and that these individuals are 
placed in a position where they must choose to compromise either their political interests or 
economic interests. My own view is that there will often be an alignment of these interests, that 
political and economic interests are typically one and the same. However, I accept that in the United 
States, where Alzola admittedly restricts his criticism, much political debate centres on the so-called 
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‘culture wars’ where economic interests are not as prominent. Nevertheless, many investors 
specifically use their shareholdings of corporations to express political preferences. For example, 
investors concerned about climate change have publicly divested their shareholding of oil 
companies. And many employees join trade unions in order to support political positions in relation 
to labour rights and pro-labour economic policy choices. Werhane (1985: 62) argues that corporate 
moral rights cannot trump or exceed individual rights, and that includes in respect of political rights 
too. As such, she argues (1985: 109) that corporations must respect that their individual employees 
have political rights and should not be denied the opportunity to exercise them.  
 
Interestingly, Alzola seems to condone the political activities of other non-commercial groups, such 
as the Sierra Club6, on the basis that these activities do not violate the principle of internal 
democracy and the need for members’ consent: that their members know that they are consenting 
to political action in support of specific values and beliefs when they join the organisation. Yet, the 
political action of these groups does violate the principle of political equality. Many of these groups, 
for example the National Rifle Association or Greenpeace have significant resources to spend on 
lobbying. If corporate lobbying is morally suspect, then similar political activity by all other well-
resourced collective entities is also morally suspect. The actual basis of Alzola’s moral unease is not 
clear: is it the unequal resources to expend on lobbying, or the nature of the group itself? Does a 
well-resourced special-interest group, formed with the sole purpose of influencing public policy, not 
represent a similar threat to political equality as a corporation? And is it not the case that such 
groups have the ability to exert undue influence in political processes, which is a charge regularly 
levelled at the National Rifle Association’s influence on the gun control debate in the United States, 
for example, or the influence of Congress of South African Trade Unions on labour market policy in 
South Africa? For that matter, wealthy individuals, who are able to invest considerable resources 
into lobbying in support of their own individual interests, can also have undue influence over policy. 
                                                          
6
 A pro-conservation group in the United States. 
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This too jeopardizes political equality. Does this imply that there is a need to curtail and restrict the 
political rights of wealthy individuals to protect political equality? These are important and topical 
questions, without simple answers. There are ongoing debates in a number of countries about the 
role of money of politics, including trade union’s financial support of political parties in the United 
Kingdom, the limits on individual and corporate donations to political candidates in the US, and the 
lack of transparency about political party funding in South Africa.  
 
Social Dialogue, Corporatism, and the Political Rights of Corporations 
Alzola’s rights-based critique of corporate political activity reflects a traditional, liberal view of 
democracy within a particular market-led political economy. His argument may not hold in other 
democratic systems and political economies, which place more emphasis on a communitarian 
approach; governance systems that value co-determination between important constituencies in 
society; pluralism and more participatory forms of democracy than periodic voting for political 
representatives. Social partnership, ‘policy concertation’, social compacts, and co-determination, are 
some of the names given to these participative forms of governance. Countries that have adopted 
these norms in their policy-making processes, particularly in respect of economic policy, include 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Australia, and South Africa. These societies often regard 
these arrangements as expansions of conventional democracy; and not as threats to political 
equality amongst individuals.  
 
The International Labour Organisation defines concertation as a process of moving towards 
consensus on economic and social policy matters through dialogue among social partners, namely 
government, employer organisations, and representatives of workers (Trebilock, 1994: 3-4). Also 
known as ‘tripartism’, ‘corporatism’, or ‘social partnership’, it is a form of representative democracy 
that arguably augments parliamentary democracy (Trebilock, 1994: 7) with the purpose of 
promoting social solidarity and cohesion (Kim and Van der Westerhuizen, 2015: 88). This model of 
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democracy recognises the political rights of collectives to defend their interests. Government cedes 
some of its monopoly on making the rules in exchange for ‘social peace’ (Trebilock, 1994: 7). This 
model is regarded as having contributed to social harmony and economic prosperity in many 
Western European countries in the latter-half of the twentieth century (Kim and Van der 
Westerhuizen, 2015: 97). 
  
One of the reasons for choosing to write on this particular topic is the paucity of literature on the 
ethics of corporate lobbying in South Africa, and similar developing democracies. Prevailing moral 
norms about the role of corporations in society in general, and in public policy making specifically, 
may differ in such democracies from long-established liberal democratic regimes, and such 
differences may or may not have implications for the moral permissibility of corporate political 
activity. South Africa’s history of a negotiated transition from an oppressive, racist regime to a 
constitutional democracy is characterised by the great value placed on participatory governance and 
the involvement of extra-parliamentary, organised, and representative groups in policy-making 
processes7. As the multi-party negotiations proceeded in the 1990s, the Apartheid state had no 
legitimacy to make policy decisions that would commit a future newly-elected democratic 
government. The establishment of numerous multi-stakeholder forums during this time brought 
greater legitimacy to policy-formulation, such as the National Manpower Commission, the National 
Economic Forum, the National Peace Committee, and the National Education Crisis Committee8.  
 
Corporations participated actively in these forums through organised business formations such as 
the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs and the Consultative Business 
                                                          
7
 Between 1995 and 2005, I had the opportunity to personally participate in several of these policy processes through my 
employment at the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI).  
8 A more detailed description of the emergence and evolution of social partnership in South Africa can be found in 
Webster and Jaynt (2014), Parsons (2007), and National Planning Commission (2015).  
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Movement; together with trade union federations like the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
and community-based organisations like the South African National Civics Organisation. The multi-
party negotiations leading to a democratic election in 1994 and the convening of a Constitutional 
Assembly thereafter, together with the rise of consultative forums, combined to entrench social 
dialogue and participatory governance in South Africa. Democracy was viewed as requiring more 
than periodic elections for elected representatives of political parties; it required participation by the 
public and by a multiplicity of civil society organisations, including corporations, in policy-making. To 
some extent this was codified in statute: The National Economic Development and Labour Council 
Act was passed by Parliament in 1994, one of the first pieces of legislation enacted by the 
democratic Parliament. This statute granted organised business, organised labour, and community 
organisations a legal right to participate in government’s economic policy-making processes and 
decisions. The post-democratic legislative framework codified participatory governance to a large 
degree, particularly in labour legislation; reflecting the value that society placed on participation and 
deliberative democracy. Organised business and organised labour secured the right to participate in 
the governance of various labour market institutions such as Sector Education and Training 
Authorities; the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration; and the boards of 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Compensation Fund.  
 
My argument is that South Africa’s post-1994 ‘social contract’ is founded on a moral norm of 
participation in public policy and governance by an assortment of organisations, including 
corporations and organised business formations and industry and trade associations. In South Africa, 
corporations are thus regarded as a type of citizen enjoying certain political rights, including the right 
to influence public policy and legislation.  
 
The social partnership model of public governance has been criticised as a system that advances the 
interests of certain groups in society at the expense of others, particularly small enterprises and 
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consumers. In South Africa, concerns have been expressed about the absence of the unemployed, 
rural women, and other social movements like Abahlali base Mjondolo9 from formal social dialogue 
(Webster and Jaynt, 2014: 2). Attempts were made to remedy this common flaw in tripartism by 
providing for the participation in Nedlac of community-based organisations representing particular 
‘outsider’ groups, including women, youth, and people with disabilities (Parsons, 2007: 10,11). 
Nevertheless, some regard this corporatist system as categorically undemocratic, unfair, and at odds 
with the principle of political equality. Indeed, in South Africa, the government itself has at times 
pulled back from its commitment to social dialogue because it believes it is a democratically elected 
government with a legitimate mandate to govern without the consent of business or labour, and the 
importance of Nedlac as a site for purposive deliberation about policy has declined accordingly since 
its heydays in the mid-1990s (Kim and Van der Westhuizen, 2015: 95, and National Planning 
Commission, 2015: 13). New and more informal forums for social dialogue were initiated by 
government including bilateral engagements with different constituencies such as ‘big business’, 
farmers, trade unions, and ‘black business’, however, even these informal arrangements have 
flagged recently. 
 
This brief discussion of social partnership attempts to present an alternative model of democracy to 
that on which Alzola directs his argument against corporate political rights. In the next section, I will 
argue that the social partnership model has direct implications for the moral rights of corporations in 
respect of their role in society.  
  
Corporate Citizenship  
Dubbink and Smith (2011) put forward an interesting argument for corporate moral responsibility 
that recognizes the inherently political role performed by corporations in democratic, market-based 
                                                          
9
 Abahlali base Mjondolo is a social movement based in South Africa’s informal settlements which fights for 
the rights of ‘shack-dwellers’ to land, housing, water and sanitation. It emerged outside of formal political 
parties or civic structures following a blockade to protest evictions in KwaZulu-Natal Province. 
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political economies. In such systems, corporations have a right to decide how to allocate capital, 
which has profound moral consequences and implications. In return, society expects that 
corporations consider moral principles in their decision-making processes. In terms of this implicit 
social contract, corporations are viewed as the most effective and efficient agents for these 
decisions, leading to greater social good than if such decisions were made by the state. Corporations 
are given this right in return for morally responsible conduct. Corporations are intrinsically political 
entities and they straddle two spheres: the market and the polity. On this account, corporations are 
not contained within a “market” which is separate to the political arena. An account of moral 
responsibility, rights and duties is needed which recognizes this and provides a guide as to what 
constitutes moral conduct where these two spheres collide and intersect.  
 
Globalisation has also threatened the traditional theory of the corporation as a private actor with 
limited liability and a focus on shareholder value (Palazzo and Scherer, 2008: 14). Globalisation can 
be understood as a collective term for a set of economic, political, and social forces and dynamics, 
that are changing the balance of forces between nation states, corporations, and civil society, 
threatening the effective functioning of traditional institutional arrangements, and pushing the rise 
of politically influential non-state and non-political actors like international non-governmental 
organisations and transnational corporations (Scherer and Palazzo, 2004: 28). Globalisation is also 
marked by the diminishing policy-making and regulatory powers of nation states because of the rise 
of powerful transnational corporations; the increase in supra-regional and international regulatory 
and standards-setting bodies like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); as well as the cross-border nature of pressing social 
problems and global public goods issues such as climate change, immigration, organized crime, and 
human-trafficking (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, and Schneider, 2012: 474). Policy-making and 
regulation are no longer the sole domain of state actors, but are increasingly the outcome of multi-
stakeholder dialogues between corporations, civil society organisations, and international agencies 
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which come together to share knowledge and resources in a bid to resolve global public policy issues 
(Scherer, et al, 2012: 478). Against this backdrop, corporations are confronting changing societal 
norms and expectations about their role and responsibilities and the social contract that binds 
corporations and society is evolving. A social contract is not necessarily ahistorical (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2004: 18), and it seems reasonable that the morally appropriate relationship between 
business and government varies from society to society, depending on the social and political norms 
that prevail over time (DeGeorge, 2008: 47). Different societies have codified in their corporate 
governance and political systems different political roles for corporations (for example co-
determination in Germany and social partnership in Ireland), which makes corporations citizens in a 
more substantial way than is the case in the US (DeGeorge, 2008:47).  Outlined above is a strong 
argument that South Africa’s particular history and the resulting institutions reflect a particular 
social contract that emphasises social dialogue, consultation and engagement between different 
groups in society, and especially between these groups and government, including the business 
community. 
 
This particular conception of the social contract deems corporations to be a type of citizen. The term 
‘corporate citizenship’ is the subject of considerable debate in the extant literature as academics 
seek to understand its meaning and the implications of regarding corporation as citizens. Some 
authors see potential in the term for understanding the corporation as a political actor and regard 
the concept of citizenship as providing a normative framework for morally assessing the political 
activities and conduct of a corporation. Others argue that the term has little value as corporations 
are clearly not citizens in any meaningful sense, and to regard them as such is to give rights to them 
that they cannot morally claim to have, as they are not full and equal members of the political 
community. Furthermore, granting corporations such rights may be a threat to a just society (Néron 
and Norman, 2008: 18), as Alzola argues. 
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There does not appear to be a commonly accepted definition of corporate citizenship (Matten and 
Crane, 2005: 2). Matten and Crane (2005: 3-5) outline two common conceptions of corporate 
citizenship: one is what they term the “limited view” describing a corporation’s philanthropy in the 
local communities in which it operates its business, while the second is equivalent to prevailing 
definitions of corporate social responsibility. Yet, they argue that both conceptions are problematic 
in that they do not actually relate to the substantive notion of citizenship which has an inherent 
political dimension.  
 
Valor (2005: 193, 195) suggests that the term ‘corporate citizenship’ was introduced to link 
corporate activities to “broader social accountability” and that the concept is useful because of “the 
meaning conveyed in citizenship.” I agree that a revised conceptualisation of corporate citizenship 
can provide a new perspective on the political nature of the corporation’s role in society, and on 
corporations as political actors. Matten and Crane (2005: 7) describe the evolving work on 
understanding citizenship and define citizenship as a set of civil, social, and political rights. They 
point out that in the liberal tradition, these are seen as individual rights and subsequently 
corporations do not easily fit into the “liberal minimalist” approach of citizenship, however more 
participatory models of democracy might accommodate them more readily (Moon, Crane and 
Matten, 2005: 429), such as the corporatist models of Germany and Ireland.  Theories of citizenship 
allow for an exploration of corporate activities within an extant literature about political relations of 
authority, power and responsibility (Crane and Matten, 2008: 30) and the concept can serve as a 
useful metaphor for understanding and assessing business-society relations as the substance of 
corporate political activities is in some meaningful way similar to that of citizenship (Moon, et al, 
2005: 432). Going further, Moon, et al, (2005: 438-448) argue that corporate citizenship is a 
meaningful concept in relation to “pressure group activity”, “developmental democracy”, and 
“deliberative democracy”, all of which are contrasted with a minimalist, liberal approach which 
seems to dominate Alzola’s critique of lobbying. Corporate citizenship implies “accountability, 
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legitimacy and participation” (Moon, et al, 2005: 435) and as such the concept allows for the 
“application of key moral features of citizenship to discover analogous features of corporations” 
(Jeurissen, 2004: 87).  Néron and Norman (2008: 15) argue that the benefit of the corporate 
citizenship metaphor is when it is used to understand “how a firm involves itself in the political 
process; and in particular how it participates in the process of developing government regulations”. 
 
If a corporation is a type of moral person, as I have argued for in a previous chapter, then it seems 
reasonable to also regard a corporation as a type of citizen, and to see citizenship as an element of 
corporate moral personhood. Critics dismiss corporate citizenship as a “fictional concept” (Valor, 
2005: 195): they argue that neither is a corporation voted for in an election (Néron and Norman, 
2008:15), nor is it able to stand for public office or to represent others in the political sphere 
(Matten and Crane, 2005: 16). Wood and Logsdon (2008: 53) propose that at the most corporations 
should only be seen as “secondary citizens” whose rights, including political rights, are “subordinate” 
to those of human persons. Van Oosterhout (2008: 36) refers to the idea of corporate citizenship as 
a ‘misguided metaphor’, although he acknowledges that it may have some conceptual merit in 
respect of the “connotations of political citizenship” and the political activities of firms. However, he 
argues that the concept’s value is limited because the problem of corporate political activity arises 
“precisely because corporations are not citizens” and that it is not rational to connect such activity to 
“the idea of citizenship without simultaneously undermining the full and equal membership 
connotation that political citizenship has in modern democratic market societies,” (Van Oosterhout, 
2008: 38). Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of the metaphor, regarding a corporation as a 
type of citizen can provide a normative framework to determine the reasonable limitations on the 
exercising of corporate political rights, including lobbying. 
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Conclusion 
It is not unreasonable to regard corporations as a type of moral person that are accorded certain 
moral rights such as the right of political participation and freedom of speech. It is also reasonable, 
especially in societies that place a high value on participatory governance, to regard corporations as 
citizens with certain political rights and subject to the moral norms associated with citizenship. If we 
accept this line of reasoning, then the conclusion to be drawn is that corporations do have a moral 
right to seek to influence public policy, laws, and regulations by lobbying government. If 
corporations have moral rights, do they also have corresponding moral duties? In the next chapter, I 
seek to expand on the content of the moral duties that corporations have in the context of lobbying. 
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CHAPTER 5   
DO CORPORATIONS HAVE A MORAL DUTY TO LOBBY? 
 
Introduction 
If, as has been argued above corporations are a type of moral person with moral rights, and given 
the view that corresponding duties accompany rights, then some questions arise in connection with 
the moral duties of corporations. What is the nature of the moral duties of corporations and to who 
and whom are they liable to perform them?  
 
Much of business ethics is centered on the question of the extent of the corporation’s duties to its 
shareholders, its stakeholders, and to society. These duties arise from the reciprocal relationships 
that corporations have with other moral agents and entities (Werhane, 1985: 65) such as employees, 
managers, suppliers, investors, and customers. “A normative theory of the firm provides an account 
of the fundamental nature and purpose of the corporation, and of the moral claims to which it is 
subject,” (Langtry, 1994: 431). It attempts to explain the function of a corporation on the basis of 
underlying moral principles (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 72), and to answer the following 
questions: Who owns the corporation? For whose benefit should the corporation be operated? And 
what are the moral reasons for the legal recognition of corporations? (Moore, 1999: 122) Several 
theories of the firm will be looked at to provide an answer to the nature of a corporation’s moral 
obligations: shareholder theory; stakeholder theory; and a theory of the firm as a political actor or 
corporate citizen. It will be argued that each of these normative theories of the firm includes a moral 
obligation on a corporation to participate in political processes through lobbying in order to 
influence public policy, legislation, and regulation.  
 
The Shareholder Theory of the Firm 
The Shareholder Theory of the Firm proposes that the foremost duty of a corporation is towards its 
owners - its shareholders - to safeguard their investment in the corporation and to ensure a return 
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on that investment, a profit. The normative basis of Shareholder Theory is threefold, according to 
Moore (1999a: 119). Firstly, the property rights of shareholders; it is the property of the 
shareholders that is placed at risk if the corporation fails.  Shareholders are the providers of financial 
capital to the corporation, and are legally required to settle the corporation’s debts in the event it 
becomes bankrupt “to the extent of the value of their shareholding,” (Langtry, 1994: 486). Secondly, 
the principal-agent relationship between the corporation’s managers and its shareholders is founded 
on a fiduciary duty to protect the owner’s property. The fiduciary role generates special and 
particular duties to shareholders (Gibson, 2000: 247) and involves serving as a responsible custodian 
of the corporation’s property (Goodpaster and Holloran, 1994: 427). Thirdly, there is a utilitarian 
argument that regards privately-owned corporations as being in society’s best interest. Boatright 
(1994: 402) argues that the value of corporations, of the institution of privately-owned firms 
primarily accountable to their owners, is that it is this arrangement that generates the most benefits 
for society, and that all stakeholders are better off if corporations are run for the benefit of 
shareholders.  This view is perhaps most famously expounded by Milton Friedman (1970) in his 
article “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits”.   
 
Profit maximization has been characterized as amoral: there is no place for morality in the pursuit of 
profits and corporations must adopt the rules of the marketplace in order to compete and survive. 
But Primeaux and Stieber (1994: 289) argue that ethical norms are inherent within the concept of 
profit maximisation, if profit maximisation is understood as the process whereby society most 
efficiently allocates scarce resources according to society’s preferences, including their moral 
preferences. According to this understanding, profit maximisation is “the act of producing the right 
kind and the right amount of goods and services the consumer wants at the lowest possible cost” 
(Primeaux and Stieber, 1994: 290).  As such, profit-maximising corporations are fulfilling their side of 
the social contract. Arguably then, the fiduciary duty to maximize profits morally compels “rent-
seeking behaviour” (Boatright, 2009: 542). Rent-seeking is an economics term that describes 
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economic advantages, known as ‘rents’, obtained without concomitant economic value being 
produced. 
 
The response from government to the exploitation of market failures by corporations to maximize 
their profits is regulation to address market failures and resolve public policy challenges. The 
evolving social contract now incorporates regulation that aims to protect shareholders, employees, 
customers, the environment, and other stakeholders too. Almost every aspect of a corporation’s 
operations is subject to regulation: the employment of workers and what they are paid, the 
procurement of supplies, the servicing of customers, communication with competitors, reporting to 
shareholders, how products are designed and priced, and how waste is managed. Narrow 
compliance with the letter of law has failed to compensate for market failure which in turn has failed 
to address societal problems, all of which have led to a spiral of regulatory reform. Consequently, 
policymakers are increasingly moving away from rules-based regulation and introducing more 
principles-based approaches that require corporations to show evidence that they are 
institutionalizing an ethical approach to decision-making in their corporate cultures10. 
 
Regulation significantly and directly affects a corporation’s operating environment and constrains its 
ability to maximize profits. As regulation is costly, the Shareholder Theory of the Firm suggests that a 
corporation has a moral duty to its shareholders to oppose such regulation through lobbying. The 
vast number of regulations emanating from national governments in many industrialised countries 
substantially increases costs and erodes profits (Hillman and Hitt, 1999: 826). This is not only the 
case in developed economies. In the South African financial services sector, government published, 
on average, more than one new regulation every two weeks in 2013 (Standard Bank, 2015: 39). A 
consequence of what some have called a ‘tsunami of regulation’ is that profit-maximising 
corporations are increasingly engaging in political action to ensure their competitiveness (Hillman 
                                                          
10
 An example is the principles-based Treating Customers Fairly regulation introduced by regulators in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa to strengthen consumer protection in the financial services sector. 
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and Hitt, 1999: 826; Ostas, 2007, 34). The purpose of lobbying in this context is to protect profits, in 
line with the purpose of the corporation, according to Shareholder Theory; which  is a strategy 
aimed at using “the power of government to advance private ends” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999: 826).  
Oberman (2004: 246) explains this duty of lobbying as follows: corporations have a direct fiduciary 
duty to protect and advance the interests of their shareholders when these interests can be affected 
by government action, or inaction; they have a duty to represent the functional requirements of 
economic productivity in the process of creating balanced public policy (Oberman, 2004: 246). 
 
The Stakeholder Theory of the Firm 
I would like to begin this section with a quote from EM Dodd, Jr (in Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 
65) which captures the essence of the Stakeholder Theory of the Firm. 
If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in 
the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its 
individual members, that they are … trustees for an institution [with multiple constituents] 
rather than attorneys for the stockholders. 
 
Social norms about the purpose of a corporation have shifted away from pure shareholder theory. 
An alternate narrative about the purpose of corporations has emerged that extends beyond 
shareholders as the only moral agents to which a corporation has moral responsibilities. It has 
become clear that many different groups can impact, positively or negatively, a corporation’s pursuit 
of profit and that corporate conduct has the potential to affect a broad range of people across the 
globe (Parmar, et al, 2010: 404). The term “stakeholder” was adopted to challenge the claim that 
shareholders are the only group to whom the corporation is responsive (Parmar, et al, 2010: 205), 
and a stake can be understood as a moral claim or interest in a corporation (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995: 85). Subsequently the idea that corporations have stakeholders has become commonplace 
and unremarkable (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 65). Increasingly, the public no longer supports a 
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legal framework for corporations that allow them to generate private benefit without proper regard 
for the public benefits or harms resulting from their behaviour (Cragg, 2002: 132-133). And 
Stakeholder Theory has become embodied in widely-accepted norms for business conduct, such as 
the United Nations Global Compact, as well as in legislation, such as the South African Companies 
Act. 
 
As the nature of share ownership has changed and become more diffuse, it has emerged that there 
are other groups that generally are far more at risk from the failure of a corporation than many of its 
shareholders (Boatright, 1994: 396). While shareholders in publicly-listed corporations can dispose 
of their stakes in a corporation through securities exchanges with little effort or cost, other 
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, or local communities, may not be able to so easily divest 
of their stakes (Boatright, 1994: 396). The Stakeholder Theory of the Firm proposes that a 
corporation has duties towards those groups who are affected by the actions of the firm, including 
its employees, customers, suppliers, the communities where it operates, as well as its shareholders 
(Gibson, 2000: 245). Stakeholder Theory holds that the corporation has a moral duty to all of its 
legitimate stakeholders, and that shareholders are just one constituency amongst several that the 
corporation has obligations to. Kantian ethics provides a normative basis for Stakeholder Theory. As 
such, Stakeholder Theory is categorical: stakeholders ought to be given consideration for their own 
sakes (Moore, 1999a: 118) and their interests have intrinsic value (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 
66). Corporations are morally obligated to respect stakeholders as more than mere tools in the 
pursuit of profit and shareholder value (Gibson, 2000: 248). Stakeholder Theory is based on the 
belief that corporations have a duty to consider stakeholder interests irrespective of their 
instrumentality in respect of corporate profit objectives. There are also social justice and public 
policy grounds to operate corporations for the benefit of all their stakeholders: to promote 
distributive justice and wealth creation as a normal business practice, as opposed to the Shareholder 
Theory approach where the corporation creates wealth, which ‘trickles down’ through government’s 
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redistributive policies or through the invisible hand of the market (Moore, 1999: 124). This approach 
stands in contrast to Shareholder Theory which is predicated on a moral division of labour whereby 
corporations are responsible for creating wealth, and government is responsible for distributing that 
wealth; a division that has become blurred in a rapidly globalising international economy (Cragg, 
2002: 135-136). Under Stakeholder Theory, a corporation’s duty is therefore to seek to balance the 
interests of these stakeholders: to balance profit-seeking with fair wages and fair prices; to comply 
with regulations; and to avoid harming the environment. Understanding and seeking to balance 
stakeholder interests is a “moral endeavour” as it centres on “values, choices, potential harms and 
benefits” for a large group of stakeholders (Parmar et al, 2010: 405), and not just the providers of 
financial capital.  
 
There are volumes of articles that have been published on Stakeholder Theory: debates on the 
definition of a stakeholder; the nature of a corporation’s duties towards stakeholders; the extent of 
these duties to different stakeholders; and whether or not stakeholder theory is descriptive, 
instrumental, or normative. In respect of the latter point, some authors writing in this field argue 
that corporations should take the interests of stakeholders into consideration because stakeholders 
are instrumental to the achievement of business objectives – the emphasis is on outcomes and the 
reason for engagement is strategic rather than normative (Goodpaster, 1991: 58). This argument is 
really a supplement to Shareholder Theory, but one that explicitly acknowledges the role that other 
stakeholders play in the pursuit of profits.  
 
The Stakeholder Theory of the Firm has been challenged for undermining the property rights of the 
shareholders in corporations because it effectively limits shareholders’ right to choose how their 
property will be used (Moore, 1999: 119). This challenge has been rebutted by, inter alia, Donaldson 
and Preston (1995: 83) on the basis of a reconceptualization of property rights and the extent to 
which property rights are not wholly unfettered and are subject to certain limitations. The 
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corporation is an agent for its stakeholders (Langtry, 1994: 440) and as such it has multi-fiduciary 
duties to operate the corporation in the interests of its stakeholders, of which shareholders are just 
one group among several (Moore, 1999: 121).  
 
Goodpaster is among those who have rejected the multi-fiduciary approach as essentially rendering 
the notion of private corporations meaningless, as corporations will become de facto public 
institutions. This is the same argument that was propounded by Milton Friedman. Moore (1999: 
121) suggests that this debate reveals that property rights do not provide a sufficiently solid 
justification for either the shareholder theory or the stakeholder theory of the firm. Moore (1999: 
121) puts an alternative argument forward: corporations have duties towards stakeholders but these 
are not fiduciary duties based on property rights and agency theory, but rather that these are 
Kantian duties to not violate the rights of others which is a negative duty rather than a positive duty 
to promote the wellbeing of stakeholders, a duty of non-malfeasance rather than a duty of 
beneficence. Moore terms his approach “tinged shareholder theory” as it recognises that 
corporations do have moral duties to stakeholders and that these need to be given proper 
consideration, however the corporation retains fiduciary duties and accountability to shareholders 
alone (1999: 125). Cragg explains this approach by arguing that corporations are private 
organisations with public responsibilities, that their accountability is multifaceted, but that this does 
not diminish accountability to its shareholders, rather it broadens it (2002: 137.) 
 
A Changing Social Contract  
A Social Contract Theory of the Firm views corporations as members of a moral community which 
are provided with a licence to operate by society, and in order to enjoy certain rights and benefits as 
corporations they are expected to contribute to the common good (Hasnas, 1998: 29). Langtry 
(1994: 440) asks what rational persons, concluding a social contract, would want by agreeing to the 
existence of corporations, and suggests that “they would seek the enhanced welfare of everyone in 
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society through the creation and distribution of goods and services, opportunities for meaningful 
work”. Corporations are morally required to enhance the welfare of society on the basis of an 
“agreement between society” and the corporation, in terms of which the corporation’s existence is 
recognised “on the condition that it serves the interests of society in certain specified ways,” 
(Hasnas, 1998: 29). Society grants corporations the right to exist as single legal entities, as legal 
persons with specific rights, and an unlimited life, and in return society expects corporations to 
enhance the welfare of society” (Hasnas, 1998: 29-30). Corporations do not exist separate to society 
as distinct, self-justifying institutions, they are embedded in society, and because of this the purpose 
of corporations cannot be defined independently from society (Cragg, 2002: 132). The implicit social 
contract becomes a “benchmark” for evaluating corporate conduct and the performance of 
corporate duties (Gibson, 2000: 249).  
 
Corporations were first recognised as important societal actors in the early nineteenth century after 
being absent from philosophers’ early formulations of social contract theory (South African National 
Planning Commission, 2015: 7). Since then, society has substantially expanded its expectations of 
corporations beyond the efficient production of goods and delivery of services within the ambit of 
the law. Society has become quick to identify and condemn those corporations which are perceived 
to be reneging on their social contract because of aggressive tax avoidance, unfair labour practices, 
contributing to environmental degradation, or operating in countries with poor human rights track 
records.  Society has recognised that corporations are powerful moral agents that can be harnessed 
to enhance the common good, or at the very least be restricted from causing serious moral harm. As 
society’s expectations of corporations have changed and expanded, these expectations have 
become prevailing norms for corporate conduct and, in many countries, have increasingly found 
their way into regulation, becoming part of the legal framework within which corporations must 
comply. Yet, the list of moral demands on corporations continues apace, such that corporations are 
expected to contribute to solving societal problems like inequality and climate change. As discussed 
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in the previous chapter, corporations are increasingly assuming roles traditionally associated with 
state, including a role in rule-making and governance (Pies, Hielscher, and Beckmann, 2010: 2, 15). 
 
The Theory of the Firm as Political Actor and Corporate Citizen 
Conventional theories of the firm regard a corporation as a private actor in the economic sphere of 
society, ‘the marketplace’, and this sphere is separate and distinct from the political and civic 
spheres (Scherer, Palazzo and Matten, 2014: 143; and Palazzo and Scherer, 2008: 14). In the 
marketplace, individual citizens and corporations legitimately pursue their private interests without 
regard for the public good (Scherer, et al, 2014: 144). When a corporation does enter the political 
sphere it is to pursue its private interests as a tactic in its profit-maximisation strategy (Scherer, et al, 
2014: 147; and Palazzo and Scherer, 2008: 7).  
 
The previous chapter discussed the blurring of spheres in recent decades and subsequent calls for a 
new theory of the firm “as an economic and political actor in market societies, and as an actor that 
contributes to both private and public interests” (Scherer, et al, 2014: 148). A theory of the firm as a 
political actor, based on a reconceptualization of the meaning of corporate citizenship, suggests that 
a corporation’s responsibilities extend beyond serving only private interests – whether those of its 
shareholders, or those of its stakeholders. A corporation has public responsibilities, responsibilities 
to enrich the public good. The social contract has progressed and society now demands more from 
corporations than profit maximisation. The failure of market economies to tackle persistent 
inequality, and the contribution of business to various societal and environmental problems, the rise 
of corporate lobbying, repeated corporate scandals and fraudulent conduct, greater exposure and 
condemnation of unethical conduct have altered the terms of the contract. Society expects more: it 
expects corporations to play a constructive role in the resolution of societal problems and to 
contribute to improving the public good. These are the actions of citizens (Jeurissen, 2004: 89) and 
corporate citizenship therefore provides a new normative theory of the firm and a new basis for 
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determining the moral legitimacy of corporate conduct. The signifying essential feature of citizenship 
qua citizenship is participation in political and civic processes (Crane, et al, 2004: 109); as well as the 
privileging of public interest over private interest (Weber, 1997: 73). Therefore, a corporation, as a 
corporate citizen, has a moral duty to participate in the civic and political spheres of society.  
 
Corporations increasingly ‘participate’ in the regulation of the economic sphere – from voluntary, 
self-regulation through industry codes of conduct to an enormous mandatory rule-book enacted in 
legislation (Matten and Crane, 2005: 12). Néron and Norman (2008: 15) believe that it is in this 
respect corporate citizenship is a useful concept: in assessing how a corporation participates in the 
process of drafting regulation, both voluntary and statutory. A “regulatory state” requires 
specialised knowledge and expertise (Ostas, 1997: 34). Lobbying can serve an important role in a 
representative democracy by supplying policy-makers with relevant information (Woodstock 
Theological Centre, 2002: 57). Corporations possess a wealth of knowledge relevant to public policy 
and regulation (Van Oosterhout, 2008: 37) and are duty bound to share this with policy-makers in a 
bid for more effective policy solutions and regulation. This is reflective of a capability-based 
perspective of moral responsibility whereby if a moral agent possesses capabilities and capacities 
that can contribute to resolving societal problems then it is has a moral responsibility to deploy 
these (Palazzo and Scherer, 2008: 5), even if this crosses the so-called private-public line. Hamilton 
and Hoch (1997: 118-199) argue that if corporations have local knowledge of a policy problem and 
have some degree of causal responsibility or involvement in that problem, then they are required to 
contribute to developing policy solutions.  
 
A politically-oriented approach to corporate citizenship provides for lobbying by firms as a civic duty, 
and it includes “an affirmative moral duty to seek reasonably balanced and just laws,” (Ostas, 1997: 
33). Social contract theory also generates a duty to respect and comply with just laws and just 
institutions. Ostas (2007: 48) argues that this duty incorporates an obligation to create just laws. 
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There are numerous examples of where a corporation’s capabilities have been harnessed to address 
policy problems for the common good. One example is the role that privately-owned banks are 
expected to play in combating money laundering by monitoring transactions and reporting 
suspicious transactions to the authorities. A related example is the requirement that banks block the 
depositing of monies won through illegal internet gambling. Another example is that banks across 
the globe are required to check whether their clients have meet their US tax obligations before 
transacting with them as an attempt to address tax evasion by US citizens.  
 
The previous chapter considered an objection raised by Alzola to corporate political action based on 
a democratic deficit. Alzola’s objection relates to a potential violation of the political rights of 
individual shareholders and employees who may hold different political beliefs and have different 
political positions to those being advocated by the corporation. But beyond the individual issue 
there is also a broader democratic deficit which raises a number of questions: To whom are 
corporations accountable? And how do corporations account for their political and policy-related 
activities? What institutions exist to enforce this accountability? What consequences do 
corporations face should they fail to account? And how is public accountability reconciled with 
private ownership? Existing governance frameworks have yet to resolve this accountability problem 
(Matten and Crane, 2004: 16; Palazzo and Scherer, 2008: 9). Valor (2005: 196) proposes that a more 
politically-oriented definition of corporate citizenship can fill this deficit by providing a mechanism 
for society to sanction ethical failures by corporations, as opposed to the pure shareholder theory of 
the firm where the corporation is accountable only to its investors. 
 
A criticism of a more political approach to corporate citizenship is that it appears to legitimize the 
extension of the private sphere into the public sphere, and the blurring of economics and politics 
(Crane and Matten, 2008: 32). The crossing of the public-private boundary may represent a threat to 
“the democratic ideal of civic sovereignty and representativity,” (Néron and Norman, 2008: 10). In 
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the context of marketplace competition, the pursuit of private interests is paramount. Some argue 
that this is desirable as a matter of public policy and the common good, as capitalism and free 
markets produce the greatest good for the greatest number. However, in the public sphere, where 
laws are made, private interest and competition is an inappropriate foundation for law-making. Laws 
should reflect the moral norms and societal aspirations of a democratic society; and because law is 
by definition backed by force it needs to be predicated on public interests. This is the essence of 
social contract theory whereby individuals give up some of their individual rights to liberty and 
freedom in the greater good of society.  
 
Public Choice Theory from Public Sector Economics proposes that the rules of the marketplace will 
result in a set of laws that systematically favours the politically well-organised with narrow interests 
at the cost of the public good (Ostas, 2007: 50). Corporate lobbying allegedly captures the policy 
process and uses it to secure private, economic gains. A consequence of this rent-seeking is that the 
resultant regulatory framework lacks a moral underpinning and does not serve the public interest 
(Ostas, 2007: 51).  
 
Prevailing sentiment is that politically-active corporations are a threat to democracy (Oberman, 
2004: 246) and an unease about corporate citizenship reveals “a structural tension between the 
economic values of free-market capitalism and the political values of a democratic republic,” 
(Woodstock Theological Centre, 2002: 33).  The concentration of resources in corporations has yet to 
be reconciled with predominant democratic ideals and theory (Oberman, 2004: 245) and granting 
corporations the rights of citizenship represents a further substantive threat to a just society (Néron 
and Norman, 2008: 18). The idea that political equality means ‘one person, one vote’, that each 
citizen has an equal vote, is core to the moral foundation of democracy (Woodstock Theological 
Society, 2002: 64). The proposition that a corporation is a citizen with similar political rights to 
individuals seems to challenge this notion of political equality as it accords a corporation rights as 
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“fully entitled members of a political community” which can lead democracy to “degenerate into 
plutocracy or cronyism”(Van Oosterhout, 2008: 38). 
 
Orthodox economic theory proposes that market behaviour is self-regulated through competitive 
forces; pluralist political thinking proposes that political behaviour is also regulated through 
competitive forces, in this case the competing interests of various stakeholders (Oberman, 2004; 
248). However, pluralist democratic processes require the participation of all stakeholders to be 
procedurally fair and to produce an outcome that is in the common good (Ostas, 2007: 53). Given 
that valid concerns about fair political contestation exist even in well-established democracies such 
as the United States, it may well be that particular caution should be applied to the political 
conception of corporate citizenship in new and emerging democracies, such as South Africa. Fair 
political competition requires a strong commitment to stakeholder dialogue and participatory 
governance by the state (Ostas, 2007: 53). It is not sufficient for policy processes to merely be made 
open to all stakeholders, as many constituencies may lack the capacity and capability to exercise 
their rights to participate meaningfully. In South Africa for example, an interest group that was 
based in Limpopo Province would need the financial resources to be able to participate in public 
hearings on proposed legislation in the National Assembly located in Cape Town. Another example 
of an obstacle to fair representation is language - as most public hearings are conducted in English in 
the National Assembly, which may not be mother tongue of the affected parties.  
 
Interestingly, some of the primary concerns about corporate lobbying, that it distorts the policy 
agenda and entrenches political inequalities, echo concerns about weaknesses in democratic 
systems generally: rights versus utility; equality among individuals; and equality among institutions 
and organisations (Dahl, 1982 in Anastasiadis, 2006: 25). According to Anastasiadis (2006: 25), “This 
is significant because it implies that at least some of the criticisms of lobbying are inherent to the 
pluralist system in which lobbying takes place.” Those leading the charge for a theory of the firm as a 
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political actor acknowledge this concern is valid if a traditional limited mode of citizenship is 
accepted; but more participatory models of democracy, whether corporatist or pluralist, can more 
readily accommodate corporations as citizens (Moon, et al, 2005: 429). Furthermore, deliberative 
democracy requires a degree of tolerance for the overlap of public and private interests (Moon, et 
al, 2005: 445). These authors also make the point that bringing private interests into public policy 
deliberations is not unique to corporations or collectives – individual citizens also bring their private 
concerns, needs, and preferences into political, public deliberations (Moon, et al, 2005: 445). 
Ultimately, I concur with Néron (2009: 344) that it is exactly because there is a threat to political 
equality from corporate political action that a normative framework for guiding ethical participation 
in public policy processes by corporations is needed.  
 
Corporations Have a Duty to Lobby 
Each of the normative theories of the purpose of a corporation that have been briefly considered 
above provides a basis for the argument that corporations have a moral duty to participate in public 
policy processes through lobbying, albeit for different reasons. Shareholder Theory requires that a 
corporation engages in lobbying in order to maximise profits for shareholders, whereas Stakeholder 
Theory requires that a corporation engages in lobbying on behalf of its stakeholders in order to 
promote their interests. In contrast, the Corporate Citizenship approach requires that a corporation 
engages in lobbying to promote the public good.  
 
Nevertheless, the critics of corporate lobbying do raise valid concerns that cannot be dismissed 
readily. In the next chapter I will argue that the corporation’s duty to lobby is a duty to lobby 
responsibly. General moral principles will provide the basis for considering what responsible 
lobbying entails. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ETHICAL LOBBYING 
 
Introduction 
I have argued that corporations have a right to seek to influence public policy through lobbying. I 
have also argued that corporations have a duty to exercise this right as part of their moral 
responsibilities towards society, stakeholders, and shareholders. I will now argue that a 
corporation’s right to lobby is not unfettered and must be exercised responsibly, and that the duty 
to lobby is a duty to lobby in a responsible manner. I take responsible lobbying to be simply ethical 
lobbying. I will also explore the moral principles on which responsible lobbying should be based and 
how these principles can provide a guide to right action for those engaging in and those affected by 
corporate lobbying. 
 
Ethics and Responsible Lobbying 
The previous chapters presented a normative justification for a corporation’s right to lobby 
predicated on an argument that a corporation is a type of moral person, enjoying similar rights, 
including political rights, to those enjoyed by a natural person. A question arises as to whether or 
not the rights of a corporation may be limited, and if so, what is the moral justification for doing so.  
 
It is the role of ethics to provide corporations with a guide to right action and to assist responsible 
corporate citizens to think through how to exercise their right to lobby in a responsible manner 
(Ostas, 2007: 55, and Bauer, 2014: 65). A reliance only on lobbying regulation is insufficient to 
promote responsible lobbying given that many countries lack any form of lobbying regulation 
(Hogan, Murphy, and Chari, 2008: 129, and Pross, 2007: 8). Furthermore, there are aspects of 
lobbying which are difficult to codify into law.  
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We can state the fundamental requirements of ethical lobbying as follows and as having these 
features.  Responsible lobbying must: 
(1) contribute to the public good (Woodstock Theological Centre, 2002: 84);  
(2) contribute to the resolution of public policy problems (Woodstock Theological Centre, 
2002: 84);  
(3) be “in congruence with the corporate responsibilities towards society,” (Bauer, 2014: 
61); 
(4) take into account the common good (Woodstock Theological Centre, 2002: 84; Keffer 
and Hill: 1997: 1378); and 
(5) Not be “merely a particular set of narrow interests,” (Woodstock Theological Centre, 
2002: 84; Keffer and Hill: 1997: 1378).   
 
I believe that in teasing out the obligations of corporations in respect of responsible lobbying we can 
look towards consequentialism and Kantian ethics. I begin with consequentialist reasoning and 
lobbying.  
 
Consequentialism and Responsible Lobbying 
Consequentialist normative theories determine the rightness or wrongness of conduct on the sole 
basis of the consequences of that conduct (Driver, 2005: 34). Utilitarianism is a species of 
consequentialism. As a consequentialist theory, it holds that the morality of actions is determined by 
their contribution to overall utility or welfare (Rachels, 2012: 111). Thus on consequentialist grounds 
the moral permissibility of corporate lobbying is determined by the outcomes of that lobbying, or in 
the case of utilitarianism, whether or not corporate lobbying maximises general welfare in society. 
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Restrictions on a corporation’s right to lobby can only be justified if these produce “bad outcomes” 
(Alzola, 2013: 396), result in lower levels of utility, or cause harm to others (Rachels, 2012: 101). 
 
According to the Shareholder Theory of the Firm, a corporation is required to maximise profits and is 
constrained in doing so only by the law. As a guide to right action by the corporation, Shareholder 
Theory posits that if lobbying results in greater profits, then lobbying is morally required, on the 
basis that lobbying maximises positive outcomes for the corporation.  Yet, such lobbying may have 
negative consequences for others, and result in lower utility overall. Barker (2008) provides an 
example of the deleterious consequences of corporate lobbying in his study of an association 
representing estate agents11 in the United States. The National Association of Realtors successfully 
lobbied for the introduction of licenses for new estate agents. These requirements were found to 
have cost consumers $5.4bn per annum without any discernible improvement in the quality of 
services provided. Barker (2008: 32) argues that while the association had a legal right to lobby on 
this matter, such lobbying was not ethically responsible for it failed to take into account the costs 
and benefits for customers and the broader economy.  Barker (2008: 32) calls this type of lobbying 
“morally reprehensible” because it benefits firms at the expense of the welfare of others.  
 
There seems to be an argument to be made from the Stakeholder Theory of the Firm that 
corporations are required to engage in responsible lobbying insofar as such action produces good 
consequences for the corporation’s stakeholders. The Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, according to 
which the corporation is run to benefit a wider set of stakeholders, will permit and require lobbying 
on behalf of its stakeholders. Arguably, this may be legitimate and ethically responsible, especially 
where there is a coincidence of corporate and stakeholder interests (Hamilton and Hoch, 1997: 119). 
However, a deeper examination may reveal that aligned corporate and stakeholder interests are no 
guarantee that the overall welfare will be well served. For example, as the criticisms of corporatism 
                                                          
11
 Real estate brokers in American parlance. 
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in previous chapters indicate, tripartite agreements between trade unions, corporations and 
government to set prices and wages can greatly disadvantage the unemployed, consumers, and 
small enterprises. 
 
A theory of the firm as a political actor, as a corporate citizen, where the corporation is a legitimate 
political actor in society, generates a duty to lobby to promote valued public outcomes. Responsible 
lobbying requires a corporation to “acknowledge that there is a public good that they are 
responsible for promoting, a public good that is not equated with their private interests and that, at 
least at times, supersedes their private interests” (Weber 1996: 258). Responsible lobbying does not 
attempt to benefit a particular corporation, an industry, or even a set of stakeholders, at the 
expense of society (Dahan, Hadani and Schuler, 2013: 377; and Barker, 2008: 25).  Peterson and 
Pfitzer (2009) use the term “lobbying for good” to describe corporate lobbying that promotes the 
common good by advancing causes that are critical to society, raise industry standards or improve 
the provision of public goods, while not necessarily or directly consequential to the corporation. An 
example is Mary Kay, a US cosmetics company, that lobbied in support of the Violence Against 
Women Act in the United States Congress (Peterson and Pfitzer, 2009: 48), or the UK’s Corporate 
Leaders Group on Climate Change (SustainAbility, 2005:20). In such cases, the consequences of 
lobbying are beneficial for society. 
 
My argument is that lobbying for the interests of a single corporation, industry, or stakeholder 
group, without due regard for the costs and benefits, and rights of others is not morally legitimate. 
Lobbying for self-interest and private gain alone may fairly be described as rent-seeking, contributing 
little if anything to the common good. The extent to which such conduct risks deleterious 
consequences for the public such as the erosion of social justice (Woodstock Theological Centre, 
2002: 61), promoting an inequitable “distribution of benefits and burdens” (Hamilton and Hoch, 
1997: 124), reducing prosperity and hindering sustainable development (Oberman, 2004: 69) 
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provides a justifiable reason to limit the political rights of corporations. Alzola (2013: 396-397) 
outlines a number of other negative outcomes of corporate lobbying, including corruption, 
regulatory capture by corporate interests, an erosion of democracy, and diminished trust in the state 
and the political system.  
 
Kantian Ethics and Lobbying 
Kantian ethics, particularly the formulations of the Categorical Imperative, provides corporations 
and legislators with a robust basis for evaluating whether or not lobbying activities are morally 
responsible. Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) functions as a benchmark for testing moral norms and 
ethical rules. Kant formulated the CI in the following three ways (Bowie, 2002: 4): 
  1  Act only on maxims which you can will be universal laws of nature. 
  2  Always treat the humanity in a person as an end, and never as a means merely. 
  3  So act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which were both subject and 
sovereign at the same time. 
The extant literature reveals an implicit and explicit application of Kantian ethics to descriptions of 
morally acceptable lobbying (See for example Barker, 2008; Bauer, 2014; Grimaldi, 1998; Hamilton 
and Hoch, 1997; Keffer and Hill, 1997; Oberman, 2004; Woodstock Theological Centre, 2002). These 
maxims can be applied to argue that responsible lobbying demonstrates a number of features and 
characteristics which are discussed below. 
The first formulation of the CI implies the “self-defeating nature of immoral actions,” (Bowie, 2002: 
4). This can be translated into a maxim that ethical lobbying does not erode democracy or 
undermine political equality. Lobbying that restricts the access and voice of other citizens in the 
political system undermines the very meaning of democracy, rendering the concept meaningless. A 
practice or rule that permitted such forms of lobbying could not be rationally willed as a universal 
law, and would be irrational, and therefore not ethical. Hamilton and Hoch reflect this thinking when 
arguing that “(i)nstitutional democracy works best when its players are restrained by ethical concern 
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for the … viability of the institutions in which they contend,” (1997: 122). Similarly Oberman (2004: 
252) asserts that ethical lobbying requires that “advantaged actors in the system are held to be 
under an obligation to pay attention to the effects of their actions on contestability and to refrain 
from those actions that damage it … preserv[ing] … a contestable system of democratic 
representation” (Oberman, 2004: 252). This ethical obligation extends to recognising the legitimacy 
of elected and public officials as legislators and policy-makers (Bauer, 2014: 71). This principle is 
enshrined in several lobbying codes of conduct, including the American League of Lobbyists Code of 
Ethics (2010) and the Canadian Government’s Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (2015). The US National 
Association of State Lobbyists Statement of Lobbying Principles (2010) includes the statement: “We 
believe in the representative system of government and its processes, and that its strength is based 
in informed decision makers and fair participation by all interested parties and opponents.” It also 
includes an injunction against acting “in any manner that will undermine public confidence and trust 
in the governmental process” and a requirement to “always seek to strengthen and protect the 
integrity of the public policy process.”  
 
Bowie (2002: 8) explains that the second formulation of the CI requires that people should not be 
coerced or deceived. Ethical lobbying therefore recognises and respects the inherent dignity of 
others, it does not seek to manipulate or mislead society with exaggerated or false information, nor 
is it threatening. Oberman explains that “(e)fforts to manipulate public opinion based on half-truths 
and deceptions treat citizens as means rather than ends,” (2004:256). Lobbying regulation typically 
focuses on disclosure and promoting transparency (see for example Pross, 2007, AccountAbility, 
2005: 42, House of Commons, 2009: 3, and SustainAbility, 2005: 18), through the establishment of a 
public registry of lobbyists and lobbying activities. For example, the lobbying codes of conduct of the 
governments of Australia12 and Canada13 include disclosure requirements, as does the voluntary 
                                                          
12
 The Australian Government’s Lobbying Code of Conduct (2013) establishes a register of persons, companies 
or organisations who lobby government on behalf of their employers or clients.  
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code of the UK’s Association of Professional Political Consultants’ Code14.  In a review of lobbying in 
the UK, the House of Commons (2009: 44) stated that “(t)ransparency could be both a guardian 
against unethical activity and a means of assurance to a sceptical public.” Transparency is central to 
accountability in virtue of opening up lobbying to scrutiny. It enables the public to determine 
whether or not the positions being advocated and the benefits being sought are indeed reflective of 
its interests. This is why Hamilton and Hoch (1997: 124) refer to Kant’s third maxim as “the publicity 
test”. What would the public reaction be if the corporation’s lobbying activities were published: “If 
the society is made up largely of ethical individuals, then their collective judgement regarding the 
rightness or wrongness of a course of action should carry some weight” (Hamilton and Hoch, 1997: 
124). 
 
Yet while transparency is essential, it is not sufficient. AccountAbility (2005: 43) clarifies that 
transparency and responsibility are not the same things. Corporate lobbying may be conducted 
transparently, with all policy positions published and all engagements with government disclosed, 
but the positions being advocated may be at odds with the public interest. That is why lobbying 
regulation that only addresses disclosure is an inadequate safeguard. AccountAbility (2005: 46) 
proposes an additional check for responsible lobbying: consistency. This is, are the lobbying 
positions consistent with the corporation’s own espoused values, strategy, and corporate social 
responsibility statements? Are they consistent with commitments to stakeholders and to widely-
recognised benchmarks like the UN Global Compact, UN Sustainable Development Goals, or in the 
case of South Africa the National Development Plan? Utting (2007: 701) writes that many 
corporations are guilty of lobbying for causes that are at odds with their own Corporate Social 
Responsibility programmes. Transparency of corporate lobbying activities is essential for the public 
to be able to test for consistency in the conduct of a corporation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13
 The Canadian Government’s Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (2015) includes rules related to transparency: a 
duty to disclose lobbying and the provision of accurate information when lobbying. 
14
 Association of Professional Political Consultants’ Code (2014). 
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What the third maxim gives us in the context of Kant’s ethics is that a corporation ought to act 
simultaneously as if it is both a sovereign and a subject (Bowie, 2002: 10). The “Kingdom of Ends” 
formulation of the CI states that moral agents have a “fundamental moral obligation to act only on 
principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have 
an equal share in legislating these principles for their community” (Johnson, 2014: 25). The following 
quote from Anastasiadis (2014: 266) reveals an application of this maxim to describe responsible 
lobbying:  
In lobbying, the corporation is government-like because it is in a sense co-creating the legal/ 
regulatory environment within which it will operate, but it is also citizen-like because it will 
be bound by the laws thus created and is ultimately subject to these laws and their 
enforcement by the state.  
Responsible lobbying therefore proscribes seeking legal exceptions to suit only the corporation’s 
interests as the resulting laws would not be acceptable to everyone or every corporation. Only laws 
that are in the public interest would enjoy widespread societal endorsement. Both Grimaldi (1998: 
247) and Hamilton and Hoch (1997: 124) identify this as a critical feature of ethical lobbying.   
 
The three formulations of the categorical imperative together provide guidance for ethical lobbying. 
For corporations seeking to conduct their lobbying in a morally responsible manner, the CI enjoins 
them to adhere to the following injunctions:   
(a) the corporation’s lobbying should be fully disclosed to the public;  
(b) the corporation should develop its lobbying agenda after stakeholder engagement;  
(c) the corporation’ lobbying should be consistent with its commitments to its stakeholders 
and society, and;  
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(d) the corporation’s lobbying should not restrict the access of other stakeholders to the 
policy process. 
Keeping these injunctions in mind then policy-makers seeking to promote responsible lobbying, are 
enjoined by the CI to include the following prescripts in lobbying regulation: Lobbying should be fully 
disclosed and transparent; and public consultation processes should be equally accessible to all 
stakeholders. 
 
Objection to Lobbying only for Public Interest 
Both consequentialist and Kantian ethical theories suggest that corporate lobbying must promote 
the public interest to be morally legitimate, despite a corporation’s moral right to lobby. My claim 
that corporate lobbying is responsible only if it is directed towards public interests and that lobbying 
to promote purely private interests is morally suspect can be challenged on the basis that private 
interests are not inherently immoral. The legitimacy of narrow, purely private interests coheres with 
the views associated with Milton Friedman (1970) and neoclassical economic theory that 
corporations collectively pursuing their private self-interest produce optimal outcomes for society.  
Ostas (2007: 49) suggests that in pluralist societies, self-interested competition by different 
constituencies without concern for any wider impact is regarded by some as the best way to 
promote the general welfare of society. In such societies, it is the role of the state to arbitrate 
between the different interests, find the optimal balance, and promote the common good (Ostas, 
2007: 49).  Indeed, this contestation of interests may be seen as the very essence of democracy 
(Weber, 1996: 257), and the essence of capitalist, market-based economic growth and development. 
  
As outlined in the previous chapter, unfettered political contestation as the best way to arrive at the 
public good assumes that all stakeholders are capable of effectively representing their interests in 
the contest, that certain stakeholders are not able to unfairly dominant and sway the process (Ostas, 
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2007: 51, and Weber, 1996: 257), and that the democratic process is truly competitive (Oberman, 
2004:246, 248). In emerging democracies and in countries which are characterised by stark 
inequalities the practice of democratic pluralism may be flawed, and political competition will be “an 
imperfect guarantor of the public interest” (Oberman, 2004:246, 248). Ostas (2007: 51) argues that 
in these contexts “where all sides may not be heard, pursuit of unbridled self-interest may appear to 
be an exercise of power and privilege.” Keffer and Hill (1997: 1375) argue for a more communitarian 
definition of pluralism, where there is competition between interest groups “but with a 
concentration on the common interests of the community.” Given the potential benefits and harms 
of corporate lobbying in regard to either deepening or eroding democratic institutions, it is crucial 
that lobbying is practiced within a normative framework that recognises that democracy may be 
imperfect or still emerging (Bauer, 2014: 61, and Oberman, 2004: 247). Therefore, ethical 
constraints on lobbying are “indispensable to the functioning of a democratic society,” (Ostas, 2007: 
51). 
 
In considering the ethics of lobbying, Weber proposes that: “(a) question that may need much more 
attention is the question of what sorts of interests a business should pursue and promote through its 
political activity” (1996: 256). The answer provided by Hamilton and Hoch (1997: 120) is that the 
ethical standards for responsible lobbying should not be based on a strict separation of public versus 
private interest, but rather on a more nuanced assessment of the “standards and value claims that 
determine what is legitimate in both public and private goods.” At times, society will legitimately 
expect that private interests will be subordinated to the public good. As I have claimed elsewhere in 
this essay, the invisible hand theory of free markets – the approach to corporate responsibility that 
argues that the “business of business is business” - is no longer tenable.  At a minimum, society now 
expects corporations to demonstrate an alignment of the corporation’s private interests with 
beneficial societal outcomes. Increasingly corporations recognise this and frame their lobbying 
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arguments as public interest issues; however, this is often just window-dressing of self-interested 
rent-seeking (Barker, 2008: 23).  
 
Is it possible to distinguish between advocacy that truly pursues public good and advocacy that 
purports to do so as a disguise for private gain? To provide a definitive answer would require 
empirical analysis and would be fraught with multiple measurement challenges common to 
regulatory impact assessments and programme evaluations. Another epistemic challenge to public-
interest based corporate lobbying is whether or not there is a settled view of what constitutes “the 
public good”, especially in a pluralist and diverse society. How can a corporation really know what is 
in the public interest, even if it is well-intentioned? The solution is a process of discovery involving 
stakeholder dialogue and listening to the views and concerns of multiple voices in society. Hamilton 
and Hoch (1997: 120) propose that the public good is determined through a deliberative dialogue in 
society about ethical principles, beliefs, and values (Hamilton and Hoch, 1997: 120). It is through 
dialogue that legitimate definitions of what constitutes the public good can be arrived at (Scherer, 
Bauman-Pauly, and Schneider, 2012:479, and Bauer, 2014: 63, 71). The implication is that 
corporations need to formulate their lobbying positions after wide stakeholder engagement and 
with a sound understanding of society’s expectations. This conforms with the second formulation of 
the CI which entreats moral agents to respect the inherent dignity of others and to treat persons as 
ends in themselves, and not mere means to an end. This maxim places a duty on the corporation to 
consider the impact of its lobbying on all those affected thereby, irrespective of their relative power 
or influence (Keffer and Hill, 1997: 1375).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to describe responsible lobbying with reference to consequentialist and 
Kantian ethical theories. Consequentialist and Kantian Ethics both provide a justification for 
restricting a corporation’s inherent right to influence public policy; a right that arises from a 
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corporation’s moral personhood. Regulatory restrictions on corporate lobbying, whether statutory 
or voluntary, that limit the moral right of a corporation to lobby can be defended if these restrictions 
are grounded on the ethical principles outlined above. A corporation’s moral duty can be given 
greater substance and direction through the application of these same ethical tenets. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This research report has examined a type of corporate conduct that is widely-regarded as pernicious 
and unethical: lobbying to influence public policy and regulation. The following questions have been 
considered: Can corporations be regarded as moral persons capable of moral agency? Are attempts 
by corporations to influence public policy morally suspicious and illegitimate? What justifies the 
moral right and duty of corporations to influence public policy? And what moral principles should 
guide lobbying by business? 
 
I have argued that a corporation is a type of moral person enjoying similar moral rights and duties as 
natural persons, and as such a corporation has a moral right to engage in activities that influence 
public policy, and that this does not erode the principle of political equality and justice. Drawing on 
social contract theory, I have also argued that a corporation has a moral duty to influence public 
policy in the interests of its shareholders and stakeholders, and as a corporate citizen in a pluralist, 
democratic system. Furthermore, this duty to influence public policy is a duty that should be 
performed in a responsible manner that is guided by consequentialist reasoning and Kantian ethics.  
 
In making an argument in support of a corporation’s right and duty to lobby, a number of concepts 
and questions have been briefly explored which deserve further enquiry in future research. These 
concepts and questions include: 
- The ontology of the modern corporation and the implications for corporate moral 
responsibility.  
- The concept of corporate citizenship and its potential contribution to corporate 
accountability. 
- The normative value of a theory of the firm as a political actor.  
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- The ethics of other forms of corporate political action, especially campaign finance or 
political party funding. 
- Moral challenges that may be generated by other types of organisations, such as trade 
unions, special-interest groups, and non-governmental organisations, engaging in lobbying.  
- Moral challenges potentially arising from the political participation of wealthy individuals. 
 
Corporate political action is a worthy subject for the application of moral philosophy. The power of 
corporations is immense and the participation of corporations in politics has significant implications 
for social justice and equality. There is a real risk that the state can be captured by unelected and 
unaccountable private interests, especially in newly-established democracies, potentially ushering in 
Alzola’s “corporate dystopia”. Those who are concerned about preventing such outcomes can turn 
to ethics to provide an opportunity for a different outcome, one where the resources and influence 
of powerful corporations are harnessed in service of the greater good, and the strengthening of 
democracy. In a country like South Africa, where democratic governance is still in its infancy, 
government would be well-served to consider the regulation of lobbying in order to promote 
responsible lobbying and prevent abuse. A corporation’s moral rights should not be exercised blindly 
without regard to the impact on others, and to the rights of others. As such, corporations that seek 
to be responsible corporate citizens should exercise voluntary moral restraints on their political 
activities by implementing internal lobbying codes of conduct based on ethical principles. 
Responsible corporations should also promote the adoption of self-regulation of lobbying by the 
trade associations and business organisations of which they are members.  
 
I have focused this research report on a particular business practice that I believe is of great 
importance: lobbying. If my reasoning is correct and the arguments for this are justified it can 
therefore be concluded that not only do corporations enjoy a right to lobby, corporations have a 
moral duty to lobby to influence public policy.  
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